# [HIGH] New Attacks Trick OpenClaw AI Agent Into Running Code and Leaking Secrets

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-11
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/new-attacks-trick-openclaw-ai-agent.html

## Threat Profile

New Attacks Trick OpenClaw AI Agent Into Running Code and Leaking Secrets 
 Swati Khandelwal  Jun 11, 2026 AI Security / Data Security 
Two security teams have shown, in separate research published this week, that OpenClaw , the popular self-hosted AI agent, can be driven to run attacker-controlled code or hand over sensitive data through ordinary-looking inputs.
Imperva buried instructions inside shared contacts, vCards, and location pins that the agent executed without the victim ever seeing…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `imperva_artifactory.com`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1566.004** — Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- **T1566** — Phishing
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1059.001** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1114.003** — Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Self-hosted AI agent process spawns shell/curl/wget then executes the fetched payload

`UC_41_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmd values(Processes.process_hash) as hash from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("openclaw.exe","openclaw","python.exe","python3","node.exe","node") OR Processes.parent_process IN ("*openclaw*","*langchain*","*autogpt*","*agent.py*","*agent.js*")) AND Processes.process_name IN ("curl.exe","wget.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","bash","sh") AND (Processes.process IN ("*http://*","*https://*","*ftp://*","*Invoke-WebRequest*","*DownloadString*","*-c *","*| sh*","*| bash*")) AND NOT Processes.user IN ("*$","SYSTEM","LOCAL SERVICE","NETWORK SERVICE") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let AgentProcs = dynamic(["openclaw.exe","openclaw","python.exe","python3","node.exe","node"]);
let SuspiciousChildren = dynamic(["curl.exe","wget.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","bash","sh"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (AgentProcs)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("openclaw","langchain","autogpt","agent.py","agent.js")
| where FileName has_any (SuspiciousChildren)
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("http://","https://","ftp://","Invoke-WebRequest","DownloadString","-c ","| sh","| bash")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where AccountName !in~ ("system","local service","network service")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentProc = InitiatingProcessFileName,
          ParentCmd  = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ChildProc  = FileName,
          ChildCmd   = ProcessCommandLine,
          SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### OpenClaw agent runtime reads secrets store (.env / .aws / id_rsa) followed by external network egress

`UC_41_11` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as readTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\.env","*\\.aws\\credentials","*\\.aws\\config","*\\.ssh\\id_rsa","*\\.ssh\\id_ed25519","*\\.netrc","*credentials.json","*secrets.json")) AND (Filesystem.process_name IN ("openclaw.exe","openclaw","python.exe","python3","node.exe","node") OR Filesystem.process IN ("*openclaw*","*langchain*","*autogpt*","*agent.py*")) by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | join type=inner dest [| tstats summariesonly=true min(_time) as egressTime values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as remoteIp values(All_Traffic.dest) as remoteHost from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.process_name IN ("openclaw.exe","openclaw","python.exe","python3","node.exe","node") AND NOT (All_Traffic.dest_ip IN ("10.0.0.0/8","172.16.0.0/12","192.168.0.0/16")) by All_Traffic.src | rename All_Traffic.src as dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`] | where egressTime >= readTime AND egressTime <= readTime + 300 | eval delaySec = egressTime - readTime | table readTime egressTime delaySec dest user file_path process_name remoteIp remoteHost
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SecretPaths = dynamic([@"\.env", @"\.aws\", @"\.ssh\", @"\.netrc", "credentials.json", "secrets.json", "id_rsa", "id_ed25519"]);
let AgentProcs = dynamic(["openclaw.exe","openclaw","python.exe","python3","node.exe","node"]);
let SecretReads = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where FolderPath has_any (SecretPaths) or FileName has_any (SecretPaths)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (AgentProcs)
       or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("openclaw","langchain","autogpt","agent.py")
    | where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
    | project ReadTime = Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName,
              AccessedPath = strcat(FolderPath, "\\", FileName),
              ReadProcess  = InitiatingProcessFileName,
              ReadCmd      = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
              ReadAccount  = InitiatingProcessAccountName;
let Egress = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where RemoteIPType == "Public"
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any (AgentProcs)
       or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("openclaw","langchain","autogpt","agent.py")
    | project EgressTime = Timestamp, DeviceId, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort;
SecretReads
| join kind=inner Egress on DeviceId
| where EgressTime between (ReadTime .. ReadTime + 5m)
| project ReadTime, EgressTime,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', EgressTime, ReadTime),
          DeviceName, ReadAccount, AccessedPath, ReadProcess, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl
| order by ReadTime desc
```

### Outbound connection or DNS resolution to imperva_artifactory.com (OpenClaw PoC C2)

`UC_41_12` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.answer) as answer from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where DNS.query="imperva_artifactory.com" OR DNS.query="*.imperva_artifactory.com" by DNS.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | append [| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstSeen max(_time) as lastSeen values(Web.src) as src values(Web.user) as user from datamodel=Web.Web where Web.url="*imperva_artifactory.com*" OR Web.dest="imperva_artifactory.com" by Web.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`] | convert ctime(firstSeen) ctime(lastSeen)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let Indicator = "imperva_artifactory.com";
union isfuzzy=true
  (DeviceNetworkEvents
   | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
   | where RemoteUrl has Indicator
   | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName=InitiatingProcessAccountName,
             InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
             RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Source="NetworkEvents"),
  (DeviceEvents
   | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
   | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse" or ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
   | where AdditionalFields has Indicator or RemoteUrl has Indicator
   | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
             InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
             RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Source="DeviceEvents")
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AI-agent-driven mailbox auto-forwards messages to first-time-seen external recipient

`UC_41_13` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstSeen from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.direction="outbound" by All_Email.src_user All_Email.recipient | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | rename src_user as sender, recipient as toAddr | eval recipDomain = mvindex(split(toAddr,"@"),1) | join type=inner sender [| tstats summariesonly=true earliest(_time) as historicFirst from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.direction="outbound" by All_Email.src_user All_Email.recipient | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | rename src_user as sender, recipient as histRecip | where _time < relative_time(now(), "-30d") | stats values(histRecip) as knownRecipients by sender] | eval isFirstTime = if(isnull(mvfind(knownRecipients, toAddr)), 1, 0) | where isFirstTime=1 AND NOT recipDomain IN ("yourdomain.com","gmail.com","outlook.com") | table firstSeen sender toAddr recipDomain
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let BaselineDays = 60d;
let AgentMailboxes = dynamic([]);
let KnownRecipients = EmailEvents
    | where Timestamp between (ago(BaselineDays) .. ago(LookbackDays))
    | where EmailDirection == "Outbound"
    | summarize by SenderFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress;
let RecentOutbound = EmailEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where EmailDirection == "Outbound"
    | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
    | extend RecipientDomain = tolower(tostring(split(RecipientEmailAddress, "@")[1]))
    | where RecipientDomain !in~ ("gmail.com","outlook.com","hotmail.com")
    | project OutTime = Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, RecipientDomain, Subject, AttachmentCount;
let FirstTimeOutbound = RecentOutbound
    | join kind=leftanti KnownRecipients on SenderFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress;
FirstTimeOutbound
| join kind=inner (
    EmailEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
    | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
    | project InboundTime = Timestamp, RecipientEmailAddress, InboundSubject = Subject, InboundSender = SenderFromAddress
  ) on $left.SenderFromAddress == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| where OutTime between (InboundTime .. InboundTime + 30m)
| extend DelayMin = datetime_diff('minute', OutTime, InboundTime)
| project InboundTime, OutTime, DelayMin, MailboxOwner = SenderFromAddress, ExternalRecipient = RecipientEmailAddress, RecipientDomain, InboundSender, InboundSubject, OutboundSubject = Subject, AttachmentCount
| order by OutTime desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Microsoft Teams external-tenant chat from unverified IT-helpdesk impersonator

`UC_TEAMS_VISHING` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`o365_management_activity`
  Workload=MicrosoftTeams Operation=MessageSent
  ExternalParticipants=*
| where match(SenderDisplayName, "(?i)(help.?desk|it.?support|service.?desk|tech.?support|admin)")
| stats count, earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
    by SenderUpn, SenderDisplayName, RecipientUpn, ChatId
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where Application == "Microsoft Teams"
| where ActionType == "MessageSent"
| where RawEventData has "ExternalParticipants"
| extend SenderDisplayName = tostring(parse_json(RawEventData).SenderDisplayName)
| where SenderDisplayName matches regex @"(?i)(help.?desk|it.?support|service.?desk|tech.?support|admin)"
| project Timestamp, AccountDisplayName, IPAddress, ActivityType, SenderDisplayName, RawEventData
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `imperva_artifactory.com`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 14 use case(s) fired, 26 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.