# [HIGH] npm v12 delivers one of the biggest security improvements in years

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-06-11
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-v12-block-postinstall

## Threat Profile

Blog News npm v12 delivers one of the biggest security improvements in years npm v12 delivers one of the biggest security improvements in years Written by Dania Durnas Published on: Jun 11, 2026 npm's next major release, v12, scheduled to land July 2026 , will stop running dependency install scripts by default. 
We’re relieved to hear it. Turning off install scripts is the most useful change npm could make to its defaults. The community suffered a barrage of supply chain attacks in the last year…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.206.73`
- **Domain (defanged):** `sfrclak.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `webhook.site`
- **SHA256:** `46faab8ab153fae6e80e7cca38eab363075bb524edd79e42269217a083628f09`
- **SHA256:** `b74caeaa75e077c99f7d44f46daaf9796a3be43ecf24f2a1fd381844669da777`
- **SHA256:** `dc67467a39b70d1cd4c1f7f7a459b35058163592f4a9e8fb4dffcbba98ef210c`
- **SHA256:** `4b2399646573bb737c4969563303d8ee2e9ddbd1b271f1ca9e35ea78062538db`
- **SHA256:** `62ee164b9b306250c1172583f138c9614139264f889fa99614903c12755468d0`
- **SHA256:** `f099c5d9ec417d4445a0328ac0ada9cde79fc37410914103ae9c609cbc0ee068`
- **SHA256:** `cbb9bc5a8496243e02f3cc080efbe3e4a1430ba0671f2e43a202bf45b05479cd`
- **SHA256:** `a3894003ad1d293ba96d77881ccd2071446dc3f65f434669b49b3da92421901a`
- **SHA1:** `2553649f2322049666871cea80a5d0d6adc700ca`
- **SHA1:** `d6f3f62fd3b9f5432f5782b62d8cfd5247d5ee71`
- **SHA1:** `07d889e2dadce6f3910dcbc253317d28ca61c766`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1005** — Data from Local System
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1041** — Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1567** — Exfiltration Over Web Service
- **T1059** — Command and Scripting Interpreter
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- **T1552.004** — Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1552** — Unsecured Credentials
- **T1567.001** — Exfiltration to Code Repository

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### npm/node install-time spawn downloads Bun runtime (Shai-Hulud worm pattern)

`UC_46_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmdline values(Processes.process_path) as image from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("npm.exe","npm-cli.js","node.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe") OR Processes.parent_process IN ("*\\npm install*","*npm ci*","* preinstall *","* postinstall *")) (Processes.process IN ("*bun.exe*","*/bun*","*bun install*","*bun run*","*curl*bun.sh/install*","*iwr*bun.sh*","*Invoke-WebRequest*bun.sh*","*github.com/oven-sh/bun*")) by host Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let InstallParents = dynamic(["npm.exe","node.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","corepack.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (InstallParents)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("npm install","npm ci","yarn install","pnpm install","preinstall","postinstall")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("bun.sh/install","github.com/oven-sh/bun","bun install","bun run","\\bun.exe","/bun ")
   or FileName =~ "bun.exe"
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentImage = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          ParentCmd   = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ChildImage  = FolderPath,
          ChildCmd    = ProcessCommandLine,
          SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### npm/node install-time process beaconing to webhook.site, sfrclak.com or 142.11.206.73

`UC_46_10` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.process) as process from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.process IN ("*node.exe*","*npm.exe*","*npx.exe*","*yarn.exe*","*pnpm.exe*","*bun.exe*")) AND (All_Traffic.dest IN ("*webhook.site*","*sfrclak.com*") OR All_Traffic.dest_ip="142.11.206.73") by host All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectDomains = dynamic(["webhook.site","sfrclak.com"]);
let SuspectIPs = dynamic(["142.11.206.73"]);
let InstallProcs = dynamic(["node.exe","npm.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe","corepack.exe"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (InstallProcs)
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ (InstallProcs)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("npm install","npm ci","yarn install","pnpm install","preinstall","postinstall")
| where RemoteUrl has_any (SuspectDomains)
   or RemoteIP in (SuspectIPs)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Implicit node-gyp rebuild from binding.gyp spawns suspicious build child

`UC_46_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmd values(Processes.process_path) as path from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process IN ("*node-gyp*","*node-gyp rebuild*","*node-gyp.js*")) AND (Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","bash.exe","sh.exe")) by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 14d;
let UnexpectedChildren = dynamic(["powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","bash.exe","sh.exe"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "node-gyp"
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "binding.gyp"
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "npm install"
      and InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "node-gyp rebuild"
| where FileName in~ (UnexpectedChildren)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ChildImage = FolderPath, ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### npm install-time process reads .npmrc, SSH key, or cloud-credential file

`UC_46_12` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as paths values(Filesystem.process_name) as procs from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe")) AND (Filesystem.file_path IN ("*\\.npmrc","*\\.ssh\\id_rsa","*\\.ssh\\id_ed25519","*\\.ssh\\id_ecdsa","*\\.aws\\credentials","*\\.config\\gh\\hosts.yml","*\\.gitconfig","*\\.netrc","*\\AppData\\Roaming\\npm\\.npmrc")) by host Filesystem.user Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let InstallProcs = dynamic(["node.exe","npm.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe","corepack.exe"]);
let CredPaths = dynamic([".npmrc",".ssh\\id_rsa",".ssh\\id_ed25519",".ssh\\id_ecdsa",".aws\\credentials",".config\\gh\\hosts.yml",".gitconfig",".netrc","npm\\.npmrc"]);
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where ActionType in ("FileOpened","FileRead","FileCreated","FileModified")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (InstallProcs)
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ (InstallProcs)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("npm install","npm ci","yarn install","pnpm install","postinstall","preinstall")
| where FolderPath has_any (CredPaths) or FileName =~ ".npmrc"
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| summarize CredFiles = make_set(strcat(FolderPath, "\\", FileName), 25),
            FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Hits = count()
            by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName,
               InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| where Hits >= 2 or array_length(CredFiles) >= 2
| order by LastSeen desc
```

### npm lifecycle script harvests secrets via TruffleHog or chains to GitHub API

`UC_46_13` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as cmd from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("node.exe","npm.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe") OR Processes.parent_process IN ("*postinstall*","*preinstall*")) AND (Processes.process IN ("*trufflehog*","*gitleaks*","*detect-secrets*","*api.github.com/user/repos*","*gh repo create --public*","*git push*https://*@github.com*")) by host Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 14d;
let InstallParents = dynamic(["node.exe","npm.exe","npx.exe","yarn.exe","pnpm.exe","bun.exe","corepack.exe"]);
let ScraperIndicators = dynamic(["trufflehog","gitleaks","detect-secrets","api.github.com/user/repos","gh repo create --public","Shai-Hulud"]);
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ (InstallParents)
   or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ (InstallParents)
   or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("postinstall","preinstall","npm install","npm ci")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (ScraperIndicators)
   or FileName has_any ("trufflehog.exe","gitleaks.exe")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentImage = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ChildImage = FolderPath, ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Crypto-wallet file/keystore access by non-wallet process

`UC_CRYPTO_WALLET` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Ethereum\keystore\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Bitcoin\wallet.dat"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Exodus\exodus.wallet*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Electrum\wallets\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\MetaMask\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Phantom\*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Atomic\Local Storage\*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Ethereum\keystore\", @"\Bitcoin\", @"\Exodus\", @"\Electrum\wallets\", @"\MetaMask\", @"\Phantom\", @"\Atomic\Local Storage\")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MetaMask.exe","Exodus.exe","Atomic.exe","electrum.exe","Bitcoin.exe","Phantom.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — npm v12 delivers one of the biggest security improvements in years

`UC_46_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — npm v12 delivers one of the biggest security improvements in years ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("telemetry.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("telemetry.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — npm v12 delivers one of the biggest security improvements in years
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("telemetry.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("telemetry.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `142.11.206.73`, `sfrclak.com`, `webhook.site`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `46faab8ab153fae6e80e7cca38eab363075bb524edd79e42269217a083628f09`, `b74caeaa75e077c99f7d44f46daaf9796a3be43ecf24f2a1fd381844669da777`, `dc67467a39b70d1cd4c1f7f7a459b35058163592f4a9e8fb4dffcbba98ef210c`, `4b2399646573bb737c4969563303d8ee2e9ddbd1b271f1ca9e35ea78062538db`, `62ee164b9b306250c1172583f138c9614139264f889fa99614903c12755468d0`, `f099c5d9ec417d4445a0328ac0ada9cde79fc37410914103ae9c609cbc0ee068`, `cbb9bc5a8496243e02f3cc080efbe3e4a1430ba0671f2e43a202bf45b05479cd`, `a3894003ad1d293ba96d77881ccd2071446dc3f65f434669b49b3da92421901a` _(+3 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 14 use case(s) fired, 24 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.