# [CRIT] ShinyHunters Exploits Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day (CVE-2026-35273) to Breach Universities

**Source:** The Hacker News, CISA KEV
**Published:** 2026-06-12
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/shinyhunters-exploits-oracle-peoplesoft.html

## Threat Profile

ShinyHunters Exploits Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day (CVE-2026-35273) to Breach Universities 
 Swati Khandelwal  Jun 11, 2026 Vulnerability / Data Breach 
The ShinyHunters extortion crew exploited an unpatched flaw in Oracle PeopleSoft to break into enterprise systems, steal data, and demand payment to keep it private. The campaign hit universities hardest.
Google's Mandiant attributes it to the group it tracks as UNC6240, and dates the activity between May 27 and June 9. Oracle did not publish it…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-35273`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.200.186`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.200.187`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.200.188`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.200.189`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.200.190`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `108.174.202.99`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `176.120.22.24`
- **Domain (defanged):** `azurenetfiles.net`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1505.003** — Server Software Component: Web Shell
- **T1546** — Event Triggered Execution
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1657** — Financial Theft
- **T1485** — Data Destruction
- **T1021.004** — Remote Services: SSH
- **T1110.001** — Brute Force: Password Guessing
- **T1560.001** — Archive via Utility
- **T1187** — Forced Authentication
- **T1557.001** — LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning and SMB Relay

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### PeopleSoft CVE-2026-35273 exploit — POST to /PSEMHUB/hub or /PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector

`UC_37_9` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Web.src) as src_ip values(Web.user_agent) as user_agents values(Web.status) as status by Web.dest Web.url Web.http_method from datamodel=Web where Web.url IN ("*/PSEMHUB/hub*","*/PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector*") Web.http_method=POST | `drop_dm_object_name(Web)` | where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",src_ip) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",src_ip) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",src_ip) | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ActionType in ("HttpConnectionInspected","ConnectionInspected")
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("/PSEMHUB/hub","/PSIGW/HttpListeningConnector")
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, AdditionalFields
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### ShinyHunters staging-server IP connections — SimpleHTTP on TCP/8888

`UC_37_10` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.src) as src values(All_Traffic.user) as user from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest IN ("142.11.200.186","142.11.200.187","142.11.200.188","142.11.200.189","142.11.200.190","108.174.202.99","176.120.22.24") All_Traffic.dest_port=8888 by All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let staging_ips = dynamic(["142.11.200.186","142.11.200.187","142.11.200.188","142.11.200.189","142.11.200.190","108.174.202.99","176.120.22.24"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in (staging_ips)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, LocalPort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Unexpected .jsp files written under PSEMHUB.war web application

`UC_37_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.process_name) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path="*/PSEMHUB.war/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/PSEMHUB/logs/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/PSEMHUB/persistantstorage/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/PSEMHUB/scratchpad/*") Filesystem.action=created by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where match(file_name,"(?i)\.jsp$") OR match(file_path,"(?i)/(logs|persistantstorage|scratchpad)/") | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed","FileModified")
| where FolderPath has_any ("PSEMHUB.war","PSEMHUB\\logs","PSEMHUB/logs","persistantstorage","scratchpad")
| where FileName endswith ".jsp" or FolderPath has_any ("persistantstorage","scratchpad")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### PeopleSoft XMLDecoder persistence — XML file changes under envmetadata/data/environment

`UC_37_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.user) as user values(Filesystem.process_name) as process from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*/envmetadata/data/environment/*" Filesystem.file_name="*.xml" Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed")
| where FolderPath has "envmetadata" and FolderPath has "environment"
| where FileName endswith ".xml"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, FileSize, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### MeshCentral agent disguised as Microsoft Azure binary calling azurenetfiles.net

`UC_37_13` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(DNS.src) as src values(DNS.answer) as resolved_ip from datamodel=Network_Resolution where DNS.query="*azurenetfiles.net" by DNS.src DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let c2_domain = "azurenetfiles.net";
let net = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where RemoteUrl has c2_domain
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemoteUrl, RemotePort, SHA256=InitiatingProcessSHA256;
let dns = DeviceEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where ActionType == "DnsQueryResponse"
    | where RemoteUrl has c2_domain
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl;
union net, dns
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### ShinyHunters ransom marker file — README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT in PeopleSoft directories

`UC_37_14` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.process_name) as process values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_name="README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT" by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(60d)
| where FileName =~ "README-IF-YOU-SEE-THIS-YOUVE-BEEN-HACKED.TXT"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### PeopleSoft lateral-movement script — *_fanout.sh execution and zstd compression chain

`UC_37_15` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.user) as user values(Processes.parent_process_name) as parent values(Processes.process) as cmdline from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name="bash" OR Processes.process_name="sh" OR Processes.process_name="dash") (Processes.process="*_fanout.sh*" OR Processes.process="*zstd*" OR (Processes.process="*sshpass*" AND Processes.process="*/etc/hosts*")) by Processes.dest Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("bash","sh","dash","zsh") and ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)_fanout\.sh")
   or (FileName =~ "zstd" and ProcessCommandLine has_any ("PSEMHUB","peoplesoft","/u01","/opt/oracle"))
   or (FileName =~ "sshpass" and ProcessCommandLine has "/etc/hosts")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Outbound SMB 445 from PeopleSoft host — NetNTLM hash capture

`UC_37_16` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.src) as src values(All_Traffic.app) as app values(All_Traffic.bytes_out) as bytes_out from datamodel=Network_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=445 by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.dest_port | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | where NOT cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8",dest) AND NOT cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12",dest) AND NOT cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16",dest) AND NOT cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8",dest) | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where RemotePort == 445 and Protocol == "Tcp"
| where RemoteIPType == "Public"
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess","ConnectionAttempt")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, LocalIP
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — ShinyHunters Exploits Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day (CVE-2026-35273) to Breach Univ

`UC_37_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — ShinyHunters Exploits Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day (CVE-2026-35273) to Breach Univ ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("_fanout.sh"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/hosts*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("_fanout.sh"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — ShinyHunters Exploits Oracle PeopleSoft Zero-Day (CVE-2026-35273) to Breach Univ
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("_fanout.sh"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/etc/hosts") or FileName in~ ("_fanout.sh"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `142.11.200.186`, `142.11.200.187`, `142.11.200.188`, `142.11.200.189`, `142.11.200.190`, `108.174.202.99`, `176.120.22.24`, `azurenetfiles.net`

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-35273`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 17 use case(s) fired, 25 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.