# [HIGH] 152 Chrome Wallpaper Extensions with 105K Installs Linked to Adware and Fake Traffic

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-15
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/152-chrome-wallpaper-extensions-with.html

## Threat Profile

152 Chrome Wallpaper Extensions with 105K Installs Linked to Adware and Fake Traffic 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 15, 2026 Browser Security / Privacy 
Cybersecurity researchers have discovered a network of 152 Google Chrome extensions that act as new tab live wallpaper add-ons to distribute a potentially unwanted program (PUP) family.
The cluster spans 38 separate Chrome Web Store publisher accounts and three brand backends: tabplugins[.]com, yowgames[.]com, and chromewallpaper[.]com. They have bee…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `147.79.120.202`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `92.112.198.22`
- **Domain (defanged):** `tabplugins.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `yowgames.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `chromewallpaper.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `owhit.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `avads.live`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `147.79.120.202`, `92.112.198.22`, `tabplugins.com`, `yowgames.com`, `chromewallpaper.com`, `owhit.com`, `avads.live`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 3 use case(s) fired, 4 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.