# [CRIT] Palo Alto Warns of Active Exploitation of PAN-OS GlobalProtect VPN Flaw

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-15
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/palo-alto-warns-of-active-exploitation.html

## Threat Profile

Palo Alto Warns of Active Exploitation of PAN-OS GlobalProtect VPN Flaw 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 15, 2026 Vulnerability / VPN Security 
Palo Alto Networks has revealed that it has observed "active exploitation" of a recently disclosed PAN-OS vulnerability by an unknown threat actor to obtain unauthorized access to GlobalProtect portals.
The vulnerability in question is CVE-2026-0257 (CVSS score: 7.8), an authentication bypass flaw affecting the portal and gateway components of PAN-OS software t…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-0257`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `23.128.228.6`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `104.207.144.154`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `146.19.216.119`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `146.19.216.120`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `146.19.216.125`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `179.43.172.213`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `185.195.232.139`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `198.12.106.60`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `202.144.192.47`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1133** — External Remote Services
- **T1036** — Masquerading

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### CVE-2026-0257 GlobalProtect PoC Client-Config Signature (Win10 Pro 64-bit + empty domain)

`UC_66_5` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`pan_globalprotect` event_type=gateway-connected endpoint_os_version="Microsoft Windows 10 Pro 64-bit"
| eval domain_empty=if(isnull(source_user_info_domain) OR source_user_info_domain="" OR source_user_info_domain="-" OR source_user_info_domain=="empty", 1, 0)
| where domain_empty=1
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count values(public_ip) as public_ip values(source_user) as source_user values(machinename) as machinename by src_ip endpoint_os_version source_user_info_domain
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

### GlobalProtect Gateway/Portal Traffic From CVE-2026-0257 Attack Infrastructure IPs

`UC_66_6` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(All_Traffic.app) as app from datamodel=Network_Traffic where (All_Traffic.src in ("23.128.228.6","104.207.144.154","146.19.216.119","146.19.216.120","146.19.216.125","179.43.172.213","185.195.232.139","198.12.106.60","202.144.192.47") OR All_Traffic.dest in ("23.128.228.6","104.207.144.154","146.19.216.119","146.19.216.120","146.19.216.125","179.43.172.213","185.195.232.139","198.12.106.60","202.144.192.47")) by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest All_Traffic.action All_Traffic.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let MaliciousIPs = dynamic(['23.128.228.6','104.207.144.154','146.19.216.119','146.19.216.120','146.19.216.125','179.43.172.213','185.195.232.139','198.12.106.60','202.144.192.47']);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in (MaliciousIPs) or LocalIP in (MaliciousIPs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### GlobalProtect Session With CVE-2026-0257 PoC Default Hostnames (WINDOWS-LAPTOP-001 / DESKTOP-GP01 / GP-CLIENT)

`UC_66_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`pan_globalprotect` event_type=gateway-connected (machinename="WINDOWS-LAPTOP-001" OR machinename="DESKTOP-GP01" OR machinename="GP-CLIENT" OR host_id="WINDOWS-LAPTOP-001" OR host_id="DESKTOP-GP01" OR host_id="GP-CLIENT")
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count values(public_ip) as public_ip values(source_user) as source_user values(endpoint_os_version) as endpoint_os_version by machinename src_ip
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where DeviceName in~ ('WINDOWS-LAPTOP-001', 'DESKTOP-GP01', 'GP-CLIENT')
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, OSPlatform, OSVersion, PublicIP, LoggedOnUsers, IsAzureADJoined
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### GlobalProtect Session Reporting Vendor-Default Placeholder MAC Address

`UC_66_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`pan_globalprotect` event_type=gateway-connected (machine_mac="aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff" OR machine_mac="00:11:22:33:44:55" OR mac_address="aa:bb:cc:dd:ee:ff" OR mac_address="00:11:22:33:44:55")
| stats min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime count values(public_ip) as public_ip values(machinename) as machinename values(source_user) as source_user by machine_mac
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-0257`

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `23.128.228.6`, `104.207.144.154`, `146.19.216.119`, `146.19.216.120`, `146.19.216.125`, `179.43.172.213`, `185.195.232.139`, `198.12.106.60` _(+1 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 9 use case(s) fired, 9 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.