# [HIGH] Sniper Dz Scams Target MENA Users via Fake Facebook Offers and Browser Alerts

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-15
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/sniper-dz-scams-target-mena-users-via.html

## Threat Profile

Sniper Dz Scams Target MENA Users via Fake Facebook Offers and Browser Alerts 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 15, 2026 Social Engineering / Browser Security 
Cybersecurity researchers have disclosed details of fraudulent activity targeting users across the Middle East and North Africa by employing various fraudulent Facebook accounts impersonating politicians, public figures, and trusted organizations.
"These accounts promoted fake offers, including free mobile internet packages, financial compensatio…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `65.60.9.236`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `108.178.23.118`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `184.154.10.254`
- **Domain (defanged):** `win.feezossl.xyz`
- **Domain (defanged):** `win.anababayala.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `aff.bnaosf1he.shop`
- **Domain (defanged):** `offer.raviral.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `raviral.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `sniperdz.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `automaticgiveaway.000webhostapp.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `facebookbusiness0078.blogspot.be`
- **Domain (defanged):** `dev-cdn370.pantheonsite.io`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1566.002** — Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- **T1583.001** — Acquire Infrastructure: Domains
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Sniper Dz PhaaS infrastructure delivered via inbound email URLs

`UC_65_5` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Email.url) as url values(All_Email.subject) as subject values(All_Email.src_user) as src_user from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.url IN ("*sniperdz.com*","*raviral.com*","*win.feezossl.xyz*","*win.anababayala.com*","*aff.bnaosf1he.shop*","*automaticgiveaway.000webhostapp.com*","*facebookbusiness0078.blogspot.be*","*dev-cdn370.pantheonsite.io*") by All_Email.recipient All_Email.message_id | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SniperDzDomains = dynamic(["sniperdz.com","raviral.com","offer.raviral.com","win.feezossl.xyz","win.anababayala.com","aff.bnaosf1he.shop","automaticgiveaway.000webhostapp.com","facebookbusiness0078.blogspot.be","dev-cdn370.pantheonsite.io"]);
EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
| join kind=inner (
    EmailUrlInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | extend HostLower = tolower(UrlDomain)
    | where HostLower has_any (SniperDzDomains) or Url has_any (SniperDzDomains)
    | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain, ReportId
  ) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, SenderMailFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation, Url, UrlDomain
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### User click-through on Sniper Dz redirect URL (Safe Links)

`UC_65_6` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SniperDzDomains = dynamic(["sniperdz.com","raviral.com","offer.raviral.com","win.feezossl.xyz","win.anababayala.com","aff.bnaosf1he.shop","automaticgiveaway.000webhostapp.com","facebookbusiness0078.blogspot.be","dev-cdn370.pantheonsite.io"]);
UrlClickEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
| extend UrlLower = tolower(Url)
| where UrlLower has_any (SniperDzDomains)
| join kind=leftouter (
    EmailEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | project NetworkMessageId, SenderFromAddress, Subject, RecipientEmailAddress
  ) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, ActionType, IsClickedThrough, Workload, SenderFromAddress, Subject
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### DNS or network egress to Sniper Dz infrastructure (IP and host indicators)

`UC_65_7` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest) as dest values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.src) as src values(All_Traffic.user) as user values(All_Traffic.app) as app from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_ip IN ("65.60.9.236","108.178.23.118","184.154.10.254") OR All_Traffic.dest IN ("sniperdz.com","raviral.com","offer.raviral.com","win.feezossl.xyz","win.anababayala.com","aff.bnaosf1he.shop","automaticgiveaway.000webhostapp.com","facebookbusiness0078.blogspot.be","dev-cdn370.pantheonsite.io")) by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.user | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SniperDzIPs = dynamic(["65.60.9.236","108.178.23.118","184.154.10.254"]);
let SniperDzDomains = dynamic(["sniperdz.com","raviral.com","offer.raviral.com","win.feezossl.xyz","win.anababayala.com","aff.bnaosf1he.shop","automaticgiveaway.000webhostapp.com","facebookbusiness0078.blogspot.be","dev-cdn370.pantheonsite.io"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteIP in (SniperDzIPs)
   or (isnotempty(RemoteUrl) and tolower(RemoteUrl) has_any (SniperDzDomains))
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `65.60.9.236`, `108.178.23.118`, `184.154.10.254`, `win.feezossl.xyz`, `win.anababayala.com`, `aff.bnaosf1he.shop`, `offer.raviral.com`, `raviral.com` _(+4 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 8 use case(s) fired, 13 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.