# [CRIT] China-Linked SprySOCKS Backdoor Expands to Windows with Driver-Based Stealth

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-16
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/china-linked-sprysocks-backdoor-expands.html

## Threat Profile

China-Linked SprySOCKS Backdoor Expands to Windows with Driver-Based Stealth 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 16, 2026 Malware / Cyber Espionage 
Cybersecurity researchers have flagged two previously undocumented Windows variants of what was believed to be a Linux-only backdoor called SprySOCKS .
"The Windows variants discovered are internally marked as WIN_DRV and WIN_PLUS," ESET said in a report shared with The Hacker News. "Both come with a hard-coded C&C [command-and-control] configuration and supp…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2023-24932`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task
- **T1547.012** — Print Processors
- **T1055.012** — Process Hollowing
- **T1543.003** — Windows Service
- **T1014** — Rootkit
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Print Spooler (spoolsv.exe) spawning svchost.exe child — SprySOCKS WIN_PLUS print-processor loader

`UC_43_4` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Processes.process) as process values(Processes.process_path) as process_path values(Processes.parent_process) as parent_process from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="spoolsv.exe" Processes.process_name="svchost.exe" NOT Processes.process="*-k *" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_id Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "spoolsv.exe"
| where FileName =~ "svchost.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine !contains "-k "
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Kernel driver service registered with .dat image path (SprySOCKS DriverLoader pattern)

`UC_43_5` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Changes.object) as service_name values(All_Changes.command) as image_path values(All_Changes.user) as user from datamodel=Change.All_Changes where All_Changes.object_category="service" All_Changes.action="created" All_Changes.command="*.dat*" by All_Changes.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Changes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType == "ServiceInstalled"
| extend Extra = parse_json(AdditionalFields)
| extend ImagePath = tostring(Extra.ServiceFileName)
| extend SvcType = tostring(Extra.ServiceType)
| where ImagePath endswith ".dat"
   or ImagePath matches regex @"K[WX]1B5206BDC1743[A-Z0-9]{2}\.dat"
| where SvcType has_any ("KernelModeDriver", "FileSystemDriver", "1", "2") or isempty(SvcType)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ImagePath, SvcType, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### SprySOCKS WIN_DRV component .dat filenames written to disk (RawWNPF / DriverLoader)

`UC_43_6` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(Filesystem.file_path) as file_path values(Filesystem.process_name) as process_name values(Filesystem.user) as user from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action="created" (Filesystem.file_name="KW1B5206BDC1743FP.dat" OR Filesystem.file_name="KX1B5206BDC1743DD.dat") by Filesystem.dest | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated", "FileRenamed", "FileModified")
| where FileName in~ ("KW1B5206BDC1743FP.dat", "KX1B5206BDC1743DD.dat")
   or FileName matches regex @"^K[WX]1B5206BDC1743[A-Z0-9]{2}\.dat$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Scheduled task created with suspicious image / encoded args

`UC_SCHEDULED_TASK` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name="schtasks.exe" AND Processes.process="*/create*"
      AND (Processes.process="*powershell*" OR Processes.process="*cmd.exe*"
        OR Processes.process="*rundll32*" OR Processes.process="*-enc*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*\Users\Public*"
        OR Processes.process="*\AppData\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("powershell","cmd.exe","rundll32","-enc","FromBase64","\Users\Public","\AppData\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2023-24932`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 7 use case(s) fired, 11 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.