# [CRIT] Cisco Releases Security Updates for Actively Exploited SD-WAN Manager Flaw

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-16
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/cisco-releases-security-updates-for.html

## Threat Profile

Cisco Releases Security Updates for Actively Exploited SD-WAN Manager Flaw 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 16, 2026 Vulnerability / Network Security 
Cisco has released security updates for a medium-severity security flaw in Catalyst SD-WAN Manager that has come under active exploitation in the wild.
The vulnerability, tracked as CVE-2026-20262 , carries a CVSS score of 6.5 out of 10.0.
"A vulnerability in the web UI of Cisco Catalyst SD-WAN Manager, formerly SD-WAN vManage, could allow an authenticat…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20262`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20245`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20182`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20127`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20122`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20128`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-20133`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2022-20775`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `1.1.1.54`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `1.1.1.4`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1505.003** — Server Software Component: Web Shell
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### vManage SdraAnyConnect handler writes WAR via path traversal

`UC_49_4` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
search index=cisco_sdwan source="/var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log" "SdraAnyConnectFileUploadHandler" "uploaded Remote Access Anyconnect profile file"
| rex field=_raw "file:\s+(?<uploaded_path>\S+)\s+to\s+vManage"
| where like(uploaded_path, "%../%") OR like(uploaded_path, "%.war") OR like(uploaded_path, "%.jsp")
| stats min(_time) as first_seen, count, values(uploaded_path) as paths by host
| where first_seen >= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

### Wildfly WFLYSRV0010 deploys non-baseline WAR on vManage

`UC_49_5` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
search index=cisco_sdwan source="/var/log/nms/vmanage-appserver.log" "WFLYSRV0010: Deployed"
| rex field=_raw "WFLYSRV0010:\s+Deployed\s+.(?<war_name>\S+?\.war)"
| where isnotnull(war_name) AND NOT match(war_name, "^(vmanage|configuration|olap|scheduler|statistics|sdwan).*\.war$")
| stats min(_time) as first_seen, count, values(war_name) as war_files by host
| where first_seen >= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

### vManage service-proxy POST to attacker-deployed JSP webshell

`UC_49_6` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
search index=cisco_sdwan source="/var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log" "POST" ".jsp"
| rex field=_raw "POST\s+(?<uri_path>/\S+\.jsp)\s+HTTP"
| where isnotnull(uri_path) AND NOT match(uri_path, "^/(login|app|portal|home|static|dataservice)/")
| stats min(_time) as first_seen, count, dc(src) as unique_sources, values(uri_path) as jsp_paths by host
| where first_seen >= relative_time(now(), "-7d@d")
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Cisco Releases Security Updates for Actively Exploited SD-WAN Manager Flaw

`UC_49_3` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Cisco Releases Security Updates for Actively Exploited SD-WAN Manager Flaw ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/lib/wildfly/standalone/deployments/suspicious.war*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/log/nms/vmanage-appserver.log*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log*")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Cisco Releases Security Updates for Actively Exploited SD-WAN Manager Flaw
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/var/log/nms/vmanage-server.log", "/var/lib/wildfly/standalone/deployments/suspicious.war", "/var/log/nms/vmanage-appserver.log", "/var/log/nms/containers/service-proxy/serviceproxy-access.log"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-20262`, `CVE-2026-20245`, `CVE-2026-20182`, `CVE-2026-20127`, `CVE-2026-20122`, `CVE-2026-20128`, `CVE-2026-20133`, `CVE-2022-20775`

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `1.1.1.54`, `1.1.1.4`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 7 use case(s) fired, 7 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.