# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-54157: LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/proxy`

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-06-16
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-xmwj-c75x-6346

## Threat Profile

LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/proxy`

## Unauthenticated SSRF in /webapi/proxy allows anyone to proxy requests and inject cookies on lobehub.com

## Summary

The `/webapi/proxy` endpoint on app.lobehub.com accepts a URL in the POST body and fetches it server-side without any authentication. This is the same proxy code that was vulnerable in CVE-2024-32964, where `/api/proxy` was fixed by adding auth middleware. The `/webapi/proxy` route was never secured — it is the only webapi route…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-54157`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1526** — Cloud Service Discovery
- **T1595.002** — Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1606.001** — Forge Web Credentials: Web Cookies
- **T1552.005** — Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata API
- **T1592.002** — Gather Victim Host Information: Software

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### LobeHub /webapi/proxy POST from scripted / non-browser User-Agent

`UC_25_5` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as earliest max(_time) as latest values(Web.src) as src values(Web.http_user_agent) as user_agents from datamodel=Web.Web where Web.uri_path="/webapi/proxy" Web.http_method=POST by Web.dest Web.http_user_agent
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| where match(http_user_agent, "(?i)(curl|wget|python-requests|python-urllib|Go-http-client|powershell|httpie|libwww|java/|axios|node-fetch|nuclei|ffuf|gobuster)") OR http_user_agent="" OR http_user_agent="-"
| eval first_seen=strftime(earliest,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| table first_seen, src, dest, http_user_agent, count
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let suspicious_ua = dynamic(["curl","wget","python-requests","python-urllib","go-http-client","powershell","httpie","libwww","java/","axios","node-fetch","nuclei","ffuf","gobuster"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where RemoteUrl has "lobehub.com/webapi/proxy"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe","opera.exe","iexplore.exe","safari.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### LobeHub /webapi/proxy SSRF body targets internal IP or cloud-metadata endpoint

`UC_25_6` · phase: **recon** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
index=* sourcetype IN (waf:*, proxy:*, nginx:access, apache:access, vercel:*, cloudflare:*) uri="*/webapi/proxy*" method=POST
| rex field=_raw "(?i)(?<ssrf_target>https?://(?:127\.|10\.|192\.168\.|172\.(?:1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|169\.254\.169\.254|metadata\.google\.internal|metadata\.azure\.com|localhost|0\.0\.0\.0)[\w\.\-/:?&=%]*|file://[\w\.\-/]+)"
| where isnotnull(ssrf_target)
| stats count min(_time) as earliest values(ssrf_target) as targets values(src_ip) as sources values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by uri, method
| eval first_seen=strftime(earliest,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - count
```

### LobeHub /webapi/proxy response reflects Clerk session cookie with Domain=lobehub.com

`UC_25_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
index=* sourcetype IN (waf:*, vercel:*, proxy:*, nginx:access, cloudflare:*) uri="*/webapi/proxy*"
| rex field=_raw max_match=5 "(?i)set-cookie:\s*(?<reflected_cookie>(?:__session|__clerk_db_jwt|__client_uat)=[^;]+;[^\n\r]*Domain=\.?lobehub\.com[^\n\r]*)"
| where isnotnull(reflected_cookie)
| stats count min(_time) as earliest values(reflected_cookie) as cookies values(src_ip) as sources values(http_user_agent) as user_agents by uri
| eval first_seen=strftime(earliest,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - count
```

### Self-hosted LobeHub node process making outbound to internal / metadata IP (post-exploit SSRF)

`UC_25_8` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as earliest values(All_Traffic.dest) as dests values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as ports from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest IN ("169.254.169.254","100.100.100.200") OR All_Traffic.dest="metadata.google.internal" OR All_Traffic.dest="metadata.azure.com" OR cidrmatch("10.0.0.0/8", All_Traffic.dest) OR cidrmatch("192.168.0.0/16", All_Traffic.dest) OR cidrmatch("172.16.0.0/12", All_Traffic.dest) OR cidrmatch("127.0.0.0/8", All_Traffic.dest)) (All_Traffic.app="node*" OR All_Traffic.process_name="node*") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.app
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| eval first_seen=strftime(earliest,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let metadata_ips = dynamic(["169.254.169.254","100.100.100.200"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has_any ("lobehub","lobe-chat","@lobehub/lobehub","lobe-server")
| where RemoteIP in (metadata_ips)
   or RemoteUrl has_any ("metadata.google.internal","metadata.azure.com","169.254.169.254")
   or (RemoteIPType == "Private" and RemotePort !in (53, 5353))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, Protocol
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Vulnerable LobeHub <=2.1.56 in Defender / Sentinel vulnerability inventory

`UC_25_9` · phase: **weapon** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=t count min(_time) as earliest values(Vulnerabilities.severity) as severity values(Vulnerabilities.signature) as signature from datamodel=Vulnerabilities.Vulnerabilities where Vulnerabilities.cve="CVE-2026-54157" OR (Vulnerabilities.signature="*LobeHub*" OR Vulnerabilities.signature="*lobe-chat*" OR Vulnerabilities.signature="*@lobehub/lobehub*") by Vulnerabilities.dest Vulnerabilities.cve Vulnerabilities.severity
| `drop_dm_object_name(Vulnerabilities)`
| eval first_seen=strftime(earliest,"%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
| sort - severity
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceTvmSoftwareVulnerabilities
| where CveId == "CVE-2026-54157"
   or (SoftwareName has_any ("lobehub","lobe-chat","@lobehub/lobehub") and SoftwareVersion matches regex @"^([01]\.|2\.(0|1\.([0-9]|[1-4][0-9]|5[0-6])))($|[^0-9])")
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceInfo
    | summarize arg_max(Timestamp,*) by DeviceId
    | project DeviceId, PublicIP, IsInternetFacing, OSPlatform
  ) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceId, DeviceName, OSPlatform, SoftwareVendor, SoftwareName, SoftwareVersion, CveId, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel, RecommendedSecurityUpdate, PublicIP, IsInternetFacing
| order by IsInternetFacing desc, VulnerabilitySeverityLevel asc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-54157: LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/prox

`UC_25_4` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-54157: LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/prox ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("next.js"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("next.js"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-54157: LobeHub: Unauthenticated SSRF in `/webapi/prox
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("next.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("next.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-54157`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 10 use case(s) fired, 14 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.