# [CRIT] Ransomware gang abuses Microsoft Teams relays to hide malicious traffic

**Source:** BleepingComputer
**Published:** 2026-06-16
**Article:** https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/ransomware-gang-abuses-microsoft-teams-relays-to-hide-malicious-traffic/

## Threat Profile

Ransomware gang abuses Microsoft Teams relays to hide malicious traffic 
By Bill Toulas 
June 16, 2026
06:18 AM
0 
DragonForce ransomware used a custom malware named 'Backdoor.Turn' to hide command-and-control traffic inside Microsoft Teams relay infrastructure.
The backdoor abuses the Traversal Using Relays around NAT (TURN) protocol used by Microsoft Teams to distribute messages when a direct connection to the client is unavailable (e.g., clients on a private network).
DragonForce is a ransomw…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2023-52271`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-61155`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-1055`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `62.164.177.25`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `192.36.27.51`
- **Domain (defanged):** `projetosmecanicos.com.br`
- **Domain (defanged):** `socialbizsolutions.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `professionalhomebasedbusiness.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `safefire.jo`
- **Domain (defanged):** `glanz-gmbh.de`
- **Domain (defanged):** `turnkeyaiagents.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `comunidadesparentais.com.br`
- **Domain (defanged):** `mysimerp.net`
- **SHA256:** `82b37a92589dfd4d67ca87eb9e52ac8e682e8e60d2211f59074cd5ccc693013b`
- **SHA256:** `821da79d727351dd67ce5df7950e9a3de6647a3cf474bb3a093f67507fed92a6`
- **SHA256:** `b6628d201c2a68d2a3de2a87de7a5acfe21b101a97928e1c8d5c82102d967383`
- **SHA256:** `ce66b8221446c9b6d83f0ce6382f430e519601641e5daaaf1ca7a8a8806cb0b0`
- **SHA256:** `f174c19902523dcf005fa044b6598403a5e5c0a5982398d1bc0dcc5ec1cd351b`
- **SHA256:** `142bac0e2148e0d47891b6cd7311195c4acbe33b700fad54a201c52a2bc46219`
- **SHA256:** `8395b621bb4415090f232c59fc41d24ea41a519b58eabe512f3ae7d2fdf049a3`
- **SHA256:** `9335f61f8ad276d94455c5b6876fea48152c3cea759f2598c8108ee461fa5759`
- **SHA256:** `cd078957167e1af4de39aecdb981cd14156fa81d5a9c6ac51e74ae5b6199a12a`
- **SHA256:** `b16e217cdca19e00c1b68bdfb28ead53b20adeabd6edcd91542f9fbf48942877`
- **SHA256:** `d20a3c928761fe00ac522eeb474612b5804cd9108453ea8591106d5d4428428e`
- **SHA256:** `8284c8676cc22c4b2e66826ac16986da7ddecba1f2776b16771be17bfdc45dc2`
- **SHA256:** `65ab49119c845801f29a57e8aa177146b2ffbd289d4278109b146f933380f951`
- **SHA256:** `6bbf10bcbef7ac5102b54c81137859891a3802dbacd888be90f990d50e18b0b4`
- **SHA256:** `252a8bb2eb9c96c5e6cc7cab822e2ed0d508032f9350351221781684e86c03ab`
- **SHA256:** `8a4033425d36cd99fe23e6faef9764fbf555f362ebdb5b72379342fbbe4c5531`
- **SHA256:** `e45b18c93d187aac5c4486f57483bc87580e15def82a312bfb377ff16eb96b22`
- **SHA256:** `087f002df0a02c8c74f3ba5cd99cf29fb9efff38bf57b3d808e34a5dd4200dd2`
- **SHA256:** `048e18416177de2ead251abdf4d89837f6807c6aba4d5b1debe49adfdecbf05c`
- **SHA256:** `6f9fbe29f8cc2788e2bc9d631e0eea2a8e9837076837b55838005a0e654f0a9e`
- **SHA256:** `d0da2832ae1e13a98f7ce7e33a66c1b0d9797b81f69ece134e4462ea55ac923e`
- **SHA256:** `aea26980059ef2ad11e99556a4edfa1f8ec769fa9f06aa573b81bedf319954b5`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.004** — Phishing: Spearphishing Voice
- **T1566** — Phishing
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1486** — Data Encrypted for Impact
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1068** — Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- **T1562.001** — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
- **T1014** — Rootkit
- **T1574.002** — Hijack Execution Flow: DLL Side-Loading
- **T1055** — Process Injection
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1112** — Modify Registry
- **T1078.003** — Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
- **T1090.002** — Proxy: External Proxy
- **T1102.002** — Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### DragonForce BYOVD: Huawei/Topaz/K7/ToF drivers + ABYSSWORKER load for EDR kill

`UC_41_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.action=created (Filesystem.file_name IN ("HWAuidoOs2Ec.sys","hwauidoos2ec.sys","wsftprm.sys","GameDriverx64.sys","gamedriverx64.sys","K7RKScan.sys","k7rkscan.sys") OR Filesystem.file_name="*abyssworker*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let DriverNames = dynamic(["hwauidoos2ec.sys","wsftprm.sys","gamedriverx64.sys","k7rkscan.sys","abyssworker"]);
let FileHits = DeviceFileEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed")
    | where FileName has_any (DriverNames)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, Source = "FileEvent";
let LoadHits = DeviceImageLoadEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where FileName has_any (DriverNames)
    | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName = "", InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, FileName, SHA256, Source = "ImageLoad";
union FileHits, LoadHits
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Backdoor.Turn DLL sideload via legitimate VirtualBox/DbgView host + outbound TURN

`UC_41_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("dbgview.exe","dbgview64.exe","VirtualBox.exe","VBoxManage.exe","VBoxSVC.exe") NOT (Processes.process_path="*\\Program Files\\*" OR Processes.process_path="*\\Program Files (x86)\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("dbgview.exe","dbgview64.exe","virtualbox.exe","vboxmanage.exe","vboxsvc.exe")
| where FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files\Oracle\VirtualBox"
   and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files (x86)\Oracle\VirtualBox"
   and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files\Sysinternals"
   and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files\Debugging Tools"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Temp\", @"\AppData\", @"\Users\Public\", @"\Downloads\", @"\ProgramData\", @"\PerfLogs\")
| join kind=leftouter (
    DeviceImageLoadEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("dbgview64.exe","dbgview.exe","virtualbox.exe")
    | where FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Windows\System32" and FolderPath !startswith @"C:\Program Files"
    | project DeviceId, SideloadedDll = FileName, SideloadedDllPath = FolderPath, SideloadSha = SHA256
) on DeviceId
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, HostBinary = FileName, HostPath = FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, SideloadedDll, SideloadedDllPath, SideloadSha
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### LimitBlankPassword LSA policy modified to enable network use of blank-password accounts

`UC_41_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry where Registry.registry_path="*\\SYSTEM\\CurrentControlSet\\Control\\Lsa*" Registry.registry_value_name="LimitBlankPasswordUse" Registry.registry_value_data="0x00000000" by Registry.dest Registry.user Registry.process_name Registry.registry_path Registry.registry_value_name Registry.registry_value_data | `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("RegistryValueSet","RegistryKeyCreated")
| where RegistryKey has @"\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa"
| where RegistryValueName =~ "LimitBlankPasswordUse"
| where RegistryValueData == "0" or RegistryValueData == "0x0" or RegistryValueData == "0x00000000"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData, PreviousRegistryValueData
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Backdoor.Turn C2 over Microsoft Teams TURN relay (3478/3479/443 to MS IP from non-Teams)

`UC_41_13` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime values(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as dest_ip values(All_Traffic.dest_port) as dest_port values(All_Traffic.transport) as transport from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port IN (3478,3479,3480,3481) OR (All_Traffic.dest_port=443 AND (All_Traffic.dest="*.teams.microsoft.com" OR All_Traffic.dest="*.teams.cloud.microsoft" OR All_Traffic.dest="worldaz.tr.teams.microsoft.com"))) NOT All_Traffic.app IN ("teams.exe","ms-teams.exe","msteams.exe","Microsoft.Teams.exe") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.user All_Traffic.app | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let TURNPorts = dynamic([3478,3479,3480,3481]);
let TeamsBinaries = dynamic(["teams.exe","ms-teams.exe","msteams.exe","microsoft.teams.exe"]);
let TeamsHosts = dynamic(["turn.teams.microsoft.com","worldaz.tr.teams.microsoft.com","relay.teams.microsoft.com"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess","ConnectionAttempt")
| where (Protocol =~ "Udp" and RemotePort in (TURNPorts))
   or (RemotePort == 443 and (RemoteUrl has_any (TeamsHosts) or RemoteUrl endswith ".teams.cloud.microsoft"))
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (TeamsBinaries)
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath !has @"\Microsoft\Teams\" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath !has @"\WindowsApps\MSTeams"
| summarize ConnCount = count(), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp), Ports = make_set(RemotePort), DistinctRemotes = dcount(RemoteIP), SampleUrl = any(RemoteUrl)
          by DeviceId, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessAccountName
| where ConnCount >= 3
| order by ConnCount desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Microsoft Teams external-tenant chat from unverified IT-helpdesk impersonator

`UC_TEAMS_VISHING` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
`o365_management_activity`
  Workload=MicrosoftTeams Operation=MessageSent
  ExternalParticipants=*
| where match(SenderDisplayName, "(?i)(help.?desk|it.?support|service.?desk|tech.?support|admin)")
| stats count, earliest(_time) as firstTime, latest(_time) as lastTime
    by SenderUpn, SenderDisplayName, RecipientUpn, ChatId
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where Application == "Microsoft Teams"
| where ActionType == "MessageSent"
| where RawEventData has "ExternalParticipants"
| extend SenderDisplayName = tostring(parse_json(RawEventData).SenderDisplayName)
| where SenderDisplayName matches regex @"(?i)(help.?desk|it.?support|service.?desk|tech.?support|admin)"
| project Timestamp, AccountDisplayName, IPAddress, ActivityType, SenderDisplayName, RawEventData
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Ransomware-style mass file rename / extension change

`UC_RANSOM_ENCRYPT` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, dc(Filesystem.file_name) AS files
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("modified","renamed")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, _time span=1m
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| where files > 200
| sort - files
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType in ("FileRenamed","FileModified")
| summarize files = dcount(FileName) by DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, bin(Timestamp, 1m)
| where files > 200    // empirical: > 200 unique-file renames in 1m by one account on one host
                       //            is well above the P99 of legitimate bulk-tooling
| order by files desc
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Ransomware gang abuses Microsoft Teams relays to hide malicious traffic

`UC_41_9` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Ransomware gang abuses Microsoft Teams relays to hide malicious traffic ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("hwauidoos2ec.sys","wsftprm.sys","gamedriverx64.sys","k7rkscan.sys","dbgview64.exe"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("hwauidoos2ec.sys","wsftprm.sys","gamedriverx64.sys","k7rkscan.sys","dbgview64.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Ransomware gang abuses Microsoft Teams relays to hide malicious traffic
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("hwauidoos2ec.sys", "wsftprm.sys", "gamedriverx64.sys", "k7rkscan.sys", "dbgview64.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("hwauidoos2ec.sys", "wsftprm.sys", "gamedriverx64.sys", "k7rkscan.sys", "dbgview64.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `62.164.177.25`, `192.36.27.51`, `projetosmecanicos.com.br`, `socialbizsolutions.com`, `professionalhomebasedbusiness.com`, `safefire.jo`, `glanz-gmbh.de`, `turnkeyaiagents.com` _(+2 more)_

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2023-52271`, `CVE-2025-61155`, `CVE-2025-1055`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `82b37a92589dfd4d67ca87eb9e52ac8e682e8e60d2211f59074cd5ccc693013b`, `821da79d727351dd67ce5df7950e9a3de6647a3cf474bb3a093f67507fed92a6`, `b6628d201c2a68d2a3de2a87de7a5acfe21b101a97928e1c8d5c82102d967383`, `ce66b8221446c9b6d83f0ce6382f430e519601641e5daaaf1ca7a8a8806cb0b0`, `f174c19902523dcf005fa044b6598403a5e5c0a5982398d1bc0dcc5ec1cd351b`, `142bac0e2148e0d47891b6cd7311195c4acbe33b700fad54a201c52a2bc46219`, `8395b621bb4415090f232c59fc41d24ea41a519b58eabe512f3ae7d2fdf049a3`, `9335f61f8ad276d94455c5b6876fea48152c3cea759f2598c8108ee461fa5759` _(+14 more)_


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 14 use case(s) fired, 25 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.