# [CRIT] Microsoft Details Windows Clipper Malware Campaign Using USB LNK Worm and Tor-Based C2

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-18
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/microsoft-details-windows-clipper.html

## Threat Profile

Microsoft Details Windows Clipper Malware Campaign Using USB LNK Worm and Tor-Based C2 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 18, 2026 Malware / Cryptocurrency 
Microsoft has disclosed details of a Windows-based cryptocurrency clipper campaign that has targeted users since February 2026.
"The clipper in this campaign relies on Windows Script Host and ActiveX-driven logic to launch a bundled Tor proxy and poll a hidden-service C2 [command-and-control] server," the Microsoft Defender Security Research Team sai…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- _No high-fidelity IOCs in the RSS summary._ If the source publishes a technical write-up with defanged IOCs in the body, those would be picked up automatically on the next pipeline run.

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1091** — Replication Through Removable Media
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1059.007** — JavaScript
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- **T1547** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
- **T1090.003** — Proxy: Multi-hop Proxy
- **T1572** — Protocol Tunneling
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1113** — Screen Capture

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### USB-borne LNK spawns wscript/cscript referencing removable drive path

`UC_15_4` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name=explorer.exe Processes.process_name IN ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe") (Processes.process_path="*.lnk*" OR Processes.process="*.lnk*" OR Processes.process="*\\:*.vbs*" OR Processes.process="*\\:*.js*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process,"(?i)[D-Z]:\\\\")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "explorer.exe"
| where FileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)[D-Z]:\\"
   or ProcessCommandLine has_any (".lnk",".vbs",".js",".vbe",".jse")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          ParentImage = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### WScript/CScript spawning curl, cmd, or PowerShell (Microsoft-recommended clipper signal)

`UC_15_5` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe") Processes.process_name IN ("curl.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","wget.exe","mshta.exe","regsvr32.exe","rundll32.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process Processes.process_path | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("wscript.exe","cscript.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("curl.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","wget.exe","mshta.exe","regsvr32.exe","rundll32.exe")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName,
          ParentScript = InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          ParentFolder = InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          ChildProcess = FileName,
          ChildCmd = ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Scheduled task registers wscript/cscript-launched payload for clipper persistence

`UC_15_6` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name=schtasks.exe (Processes.process="*/Create*" OR Processes.process="* /CREATE *") (Processes.process="*wscript*" OR Processes.process="*cscript*") (Processes.process="*\\AppData\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\Temp\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\ProgramData\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\Public\\*" OR Processes.process="*\\Users\\Public\\*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/Create","/CREATE")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("wscript","cscript")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("\\AppData\\","\\Temp\\","\\ProgramData\\","\\Public\\","\\Users\\Public\\")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Local SOCKS5 listener on Tor-default port from non-browser binary (bundled Tor proxy)

`UC_15_7` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where (All_Traffic.dest_port=9050 OR All_Traffic.dest_port=9150) (All_Traffic.dest_ip="127.0.0.1" OR All_Traffic.dest_ip="::1") by All_Traffic.src All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | where NOT (process_name IN ("tor.exe","firefox.exe","tor-browser.exe","brave.exe"))
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let TorPorts = dynamic([9050, 9150]);
let KnownTorClients = dynamic(["tor.exe","firefox.exe","tor-browser.exe","brave.exe","torbrowser.exe"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("ConnectionSuccess","ConnectionAttempt","ListeningConnectionCreated")
| where RemotePort in (TorPorts) or LocalPort in (TorPorts)
| where RemoteIP in ("127.0.0.1","::1") or LocalIP in ("127.0.0.1","::1")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ (KnownTorClients)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessSHA256,
          LocalIP, LocalPort, RemoteIP, RemotePort, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### PowerShell screen capture via System.Drawing CopyFromScreen (Microsoft clipper signal)

`UC_15_8` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats summariesonly=true count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe") (Processes.process="*System.Drawing*" OR Processes.process="*CopyFromScreen*" OR Processes.process="*Drawing.Bitmap*" OR Processes.process="*Drawing.Graphics*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("System.Drawing","CopyFromScreen","Drawing.Bitmap","Drawing.Graphics","FromImage","PrimaryScreen.Bounds")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          Parent = InitiatingProcessFileName,
          ParentCmd = InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Scheduled task created with suspicious image / encoded args

`UC_SCHEDULED_TASK` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name="schtasks.exe" AND Processes.process="*/create*"
      AND (Processes.process="*powershell*" OR Processes.process="*cmd.exe*"
        OR Processes.process="*rundll32*" OR Processes.process="*-enc*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*\Users\Public*"
        OR Processes.process="*\AppData\*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName =~ "schtasks.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "/create"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("powershell","cmd.exe","rundll32","-enc","FromBase64","\Users\Public","\AppData\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: 9 use case(s) fired, 18 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.