# [CRIT] AutoJack Attack Lets One Web Page Hijack AI Agent for Host Code Execution

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-19
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/autojack-attack-lets-one-web-page.html

## Threat Profile

AutoJack Attack Lets One Web Page Hijack AI Agent for Host Code Execution 
 Swati Khandelwal  Jun 19, 2026 Vulnerability / Software Supply Chain 
Microsoft researchers have detailed an exploit chain, named  AutoJack , that turns an AI browsing agent into a delivery vehicle for remote code execution.
Steer the agent to load an attacker's web page, and that page's JavaScript can reach a privileged local service on the same machine and spawn a process on the host.
No credentials, no sign-in scree…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-26030`
- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-25592`
- **Domain (defanged):** `evil.com`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1203** — Exploitation for Client Execution
- **T1059.001** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- **T1106** — Native API
- **T1189** — Drive-by Compromise
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1053.005** — Scheduled Task/Job: Scheduled Task
- **T1547.001** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### AutoGen Studio (Python) process spawns shell/LOLBin — AutoJack MCP host code execution

`UC_16_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process="*autogenstudio*" OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("autogenstudio.exe","python.exe","pythonw.exe")) AND Processes.process_name IN ("calc.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "autogenstudio" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "autogenstudio.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "autogenstudio"
| where FileName in~ ("calc.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AutoGen Studio agent fetches untrusted web page then spawns host process (AutoJack drive-by)

`UC_16_8` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as proc_time from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process="*autogenstudio*" AND Processes.process_name IN ("calc.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe","bash.exe") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | join type=inner dest [| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as net_time from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.process_name IN ("autogenstudio.exe","python.exe","pythonw.exe") AND All_Traffic.direction="outbound" by All_Traffic.src | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | rename src as dest] | where proc_time >= net_time AND proc_time <= net_time+180 | table dest user net_time proc_time process_name process
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let Window = 180s;
let AgentNet = DeviceNetworkEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(7d)
    | where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "autogenstudio" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "autogenstudio.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "autogenstudio"
    | where RemoteIPType == "Public"
    | project NetTime = Timestamp, DeviceId, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "autogenstudio" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "autogenstudio.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "autogenstudio"
| where FileName in~ ("calc.exe","cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","certutil.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe","bash.exe")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| join kind=inner AgentNet on DeviceId
| where Timestamp between (NetTime .. NetTime + Window)
| project NetTime, ProcTime = Timestamp, DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, NetTime), DeviceName, AccountName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, ChildProcess = FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by ProcTime desc
```

### Installation of vulnerable AutoGen Studio pre-release 0.4.3.dev1/.dev2 (AutoJack exposure)

`UC_16_9` · phase: **weapon** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*autogenstudio*" AND (Processes.process="*0.4.3.dev1*" OR Processes.process="*0.4.3.dev2*" OR Processes.process="*--pre*") AND (Processes.process="*pip*" OR Processes.process="*install*" OR Processes.process="*uv *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ProcessCommandLine has "autogenstudio"
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("0.4.3.dev1","0.4.3.dev2","--pre")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("pip install","pip3 install","python -m pip","uv pip","uv add")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### AutoGen Studio agent spawns persistence binary (post-AutoJack RCE follow-on)

`UC_16_10` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Low** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process="*autogenstudio*" OR Processes.parent_process_name IN ("autogenstudio.exe","python.exe","pythonw.exe")) AND Processes.process_name IN ("schtasks.exe","reg.exe","sc.exe","at.exe") AND (Processes.process="*create*" OR Processes.process="*Run*" OR Processes.process="*RunOnce*" OR Processes.process="* add *") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "autogenstudio" or InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "autogenstudio.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "autogenstudio"
| where FileName in~ ("schtasks.exe","reg.exe","sc.exe","at.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/create","schtasks","Register-ScheduledTask","New-ScheduledTask","reg add","sc create","RunOnce","CurrentVersion")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-26030`, `CVE-2026-25592`

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `evil.com`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 11 use case(s) fired, 19 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.