# [CRIT] [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-55447: Langflow: BaseFileComponent-based nodes arbitrary file read with RCE exploit

**Source:** GitHub Security Advisories
**Published:** 2026-06-19
**Article:** https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-ccv6-r384-xp75

## Threat Profile

Langflow: BaseFileComponent-based nodes arbitrary file read with RCE exploit

### Summary
All components based on `BaseFileComponent` are vulnerable to the following vulnerability:
1. Docling (`DoclingInlineComponent`)
2. Docling Serve (`DoclingRemoteComponent`)
3. Read File (`FileComponent`)
4. NVIDIA Retriever Extraction (`NvidiaIngestComponent`)
5. Video File (`VideoFileComponent`)
6. Unstructured API (`UnstructuredComponent`)

For clarity, from now on I'll only refer to Read File component.
…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-55447`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1659** — Content Injection
- **T1552.001** — Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- **T1083** — File and Directory Discovery
- **T1059.006** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Python
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Langflow file-ingestion endpoint receives archive/bundle upload (CVE-2026-55447 delivery)

`UC_7_2` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Low** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web where Web.http_method=POST (Web.url="*/api/v1/files/upload*" OR Web.url="*/api/v2/files*") by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.http_user_agent Web.status
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - count
```

### Langflow worker reads secret_key / credential files via symlink TAR traversal (CVE-2026-55447)

`UC_7_3` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/shadow*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/passwd*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.ssh/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*id_rsa*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/.aws/credentials*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*secret_key*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*private_key.pem*") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.action
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

### Langflow Python worker spawns shell / recon child process (CVE-2026-55447 Python Interpreter RCE)

`UC_7_4` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name=python* OR Processes.parent_process_name=uvicorn* OR Processes.parent_process_name=gunicorn*) Processes.parent_process="*langflow*" (Processes.process_name IN ("sh","bash","dash","zsh","curl","wget","nc","ncat","netcat","whoami","id","uname","hostname","base64","chmod","crontab")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName has_any ("python", "python3", "uvicorn", "gunicorn")
| where InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "langflow" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has "langflow"
| where FileName in~ ("sh", "bash", "dash", "zsh", "curl", "wget", "nc", "ncat", "netcat", "whoami", "id", "uname", "hostname", "base64", "chmod", "crontab")
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, FolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-55447: Langflow: BaseFileComponent-based nodes arbitr

`UC_7_1` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-55447: Langflow: BaseFileComponent-based nodes arbitr ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/tmp/trip.docx*")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — [GHSA / CRITICAL] CVE-2026-55447: Langflow: BaseFileComponent-based nodes arbitr
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/tmp/trip.docx"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-55447`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 5 use case(s) fired, 7 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.