# [CRIT] The Exploit Doesn't Exist. You Can Still Prove It Works Against You

**Source:** BleepingComputer
**Published:** 2026-06-23
**Article:** https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/the-exploit-doesnt-exist-you-can-still-prove-it-works-against-you/

## Threat Profile

The Exploit Doesn't Exist. You Can Still Prove It Works Against You 
Sponsored by Picus Security 
June 23, 2026
10:01 AM
0 
For thirty years, vulnerability management has run on what now looks like an impossible luxury: a buffer of months between when a vulnerability was found and when someone could figure  out how to weaponize it. Triage by severity, schedule the fix, validate, move on. 
That generous buffer is what made the entire system work.
AI has stripped out the manual drag that kept weap…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-29824`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2025-29824`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, 2 use case(s) fired, 3 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.