# [HIGH] Photo ZIP campaign targeting hospitality industry delivers Node.js implant for persistent access

**Source:** Microsoft Security Blog
**Published:** 2026-06-25
**Article:** https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2026/06/25/photo-zip-campaign-targeting-hospitality-industry-delivers-node-js-implant-persistent-access/

## Threat Profile

Tags Phishing 
Content types Research 
Products and services Microsoft Defender 
Topics Actionable threat insights 
Microsoft Threat Intelligence has identified an active multi-stage intrusion campaign targeting organizations in the hospitality and hotel industry since April 2026. We’ve observed this activity through aggregated threat intelligence and security signals across multiple organizations in Europe and Asia. Microsoft has not attributed this campaign to a known threat actor. 
The campai…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `safedocphoto.info`
- **Domain (defanged):** `recallnine.info`
- **Domain (defanged):** `kentjerk.info`
- **Domain (defanged):** `photodoc-secure.info`
- **Domain (defanged):** `photo-26654.cfd`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1547.001** — Persistence (article-specific)
- **T1566.002** — Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- **T1059.007** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: JavaScript
- **T1547.001** — Boot or Logon Autostart Execution: Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
- **T1059.001** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell
- **T1562.001** — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1571** — Non-Standard Port
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Calendly authentication-laundering phish: 'Booking Manager (via Calendly)' lure to hospitality staff

`UC_3_9` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email where Email.sender="*calendly.com*" by Email.src_user Email.recipient Email.subject Email.sender
| `drop_dm_object_name(Email)`
| where like(subject,"%complaint%") OR like(subject,"%inspection%") OR like(subject,"%guest%") OR like(subject,"%bedbug%")
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
| where SenderDisplayName has "Booking Manager (via Calendly)"
| join kind=leftouter (EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, SenderDisplayName, SenderMailFromAddress, SenderFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, DeliveryAction, Url, UrlDomain
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Photo ZIP campaign delivery artifacts: IMG-/PHOTO-*.png.lnk and photo-<digits>.zip

`UC_3_10` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name="*.png.lnk" OR Filesystem.file_name="photo-*.zip") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.user Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
| regex file_name="(?i)^(IMG|PHOTO)-\d+\.png\.lnk$|^photo-\d+\.zip$"
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileRenamed","FileModified")
| where FileName matches regex @"(?i)^(IMG|PHOTO)-\d+\.png\.lnk$" or FileName matches regex @"(?i)^photo-\d+\.zip$"
| extend SuspectLnkSize = (FileName endswith ".lnk" and FileSize between (1989 .. 2079))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, FileSize, SuspectLnkSize, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Node.js implant: node.exe running random .js from %LOCALAPPDATA%\Nodejs with a domain argument

`UC_3_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="node.exe" Processes.process="*\\AppData\\Local\\Nodejs\\*" Processes.process="*.js*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_hash
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where FileName =~ "node.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has @"\AppData\Local\Nodejs\"
| where ProcessCommandLine has ".js"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Node.js implant persistence: PowerShell detached relauncher (process.execPath + unref)

`UC_3_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="powershell.exe" Processes.process="*process.execPath*" Processes.process="*unref*" Processes.process="*child_process*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "process.execPath"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "unref"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "child_process"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Defender process-exclusion for %TEMP% executable via Add-MpPreference -ExclusionProcess

`UC_3_13` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_name="powershell.exe" Processes.process="*Add-MpPreference*" Processes.process="*ExclusionProcess*" Processes.process="*\\AppData\\Local\\Temp\\*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "Add-MpPreference"
| where ProcessCommandLine has "-ExclusionProcess"
| where ProcessCommandLine has @"\AppData\Local\Temp\"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Node.js implant C2 beacon to safedocphoto/recallnine/kentjerk/photodoc-secure .info domains

`UC_3_14` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where (DNS.query="safedocphoto.info" OR DNS.query="recallnine.info" OR DNS.query="kentjerk.info" OR DNS.query="photodoc-secure.info") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer
| `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName =~ "node.exe"
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("safedocphoto.info","recallnine.info","kentjerk.info","photodoc-secure.info") or RemoteUrl endswith ".info"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Protocol, ActionType
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Photo ZIP campaign targeting hospitality industry delivers Node.js implant for p

`UC_3_8` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Photo ZIP campaign targeting hospitality industry delivers Node.js implant for p ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("node.js","csc.exe","cvtres.exe","qfwe908j.ps1","bjygtujc.dll","e2hpvoyga77receb.js","jvxvdhxnfcqhusf.js","c4ycfrze.js","ffxznfds8.js","f76qthrp.js","utramdjqjrmj.exe","yeg9nfbg3qg4.exe","57avjhcz6vl0c.exe","sdnud94j7wvdn.exe","fehqf5oo.exe") OR Processes.process="*/c Reg Add*" OR Processes.process_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\E2HPVoYGA77RECeb.js*" OR Processes.process_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\jVXvdhxNfcqHuSf.js*" OR Processes.process_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\c4yCFRzE.js*" OR Processes.process_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\FfXznFDs8.js*" OR Processes.process_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\f76qtHrP.js*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\E2HPVoYGA77RECeb.js*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\jVXvdhxNfcqHuSf.js*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\c4yCFRzE.js*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\FfXznFDs8.js*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\f76qtHrP.js*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Nodejs\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Temp\utramdJQjRMJ.exe\*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*\AppData\Local\Temp\YEg9nfBg3QG4.exe\*" OR Filesystem.file_name IN ("node.js","csc.exe","cvtres.exe","qfwe908j.ps1","bjygtujc.dll","e2hpvoyga77receb.js","jvxvdhxnfcqhusf.js","c4ycfrze.js","ffxznfds8.js","f76qthrp.js","utramdjqjrmj.exe","yeg9nfbg3qg4.exe","57avjhcz6vl0c.exe","sdnud94j7wvdn.exe","fehqf5oo.exe"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Photo ZIP campaign targeting hospitality industry delivers Node.js implant for p
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("node.js", "csc.exe", "cvtres.exe", "qfwe908j.ps1", "bjygtujc.dll", "e2hpvoyga77receb.js", "jvxvdhxnfcqhusf.js", "c4ycfrze.js", "ffxznfds8.js", "f76qthrp.js", "utramdjqjrmj.exe", "yeg9nfbg3qg4.exe", "57avjhcz6vl0c.exe", "sdnud94j7wvdn.exe", "fehqf5oo.exe") or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("/c Reg Add") or FolderPath has_any ("\AppData\Local\Nodejs\E2HPVoYGA77RECeb.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\jVXvdhxNfcqHuSf.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\c4yCFRzE.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\FfXznFDs8.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\f76qtHrP.js"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("\AppData\Local\Nodejs\E2HPVoYGA77RECeb.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\jVXvdhxNfcqHuSf.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\c4yCFRzE.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\FfXznFDs8.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\f76qtHrP.js", "\AppData\Local\Nodejs\", "\AppData\Local\Temp\utramdJQjRMJ.exe\", "\AppData\Local\Temp\YEg9nfBg3QG4.exe\") or FileName in~ ("node.js", "csc.exe", "cvtres.exe", "qfwe908j.ps1", "bjygtujc.dll", "e2hpvoyga77receb.js", "jvxvdhxnfcqhusf.js", "c4ycfrze.js", "ffxznfds8.js", "f76qthrp.js", "utramdjqjrmj.exe", "yeg9nfbg3qg4.exe", "57avjhcz6vl0c.exe", "sdnud94j7wvdn.exe", "fehqf5oo.exe"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `safedocphoto.info`, `recallnine.info`, `kentjerk.info`, `photodoc-secure.info`, `photo-26654.cfd`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 15 use case(s) fired, 24 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.