# [CRIT] Chinese-Speaking APT Deploys New TinyRCT Backdoor in Southeast Asia Campaign

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-26
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/chinese-speaking-apt-deploys-new.html

## Threat Profile

Chinese-Speaking APT Deploys New TinyRCT Backdoor in Southeast Asia Campaign 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 26, 2026 Cyber Espionage / Malware 
A Chinese-speaking advanced persistent threat (APT) actor has been linked to a new custom backdoor called TinyRCT as part of cyber attacks aimed at government entities and critical infrastructure in Southeast Asia.
The activity, particularly aimed at state-owned enterprises in the energy and government sectors, has been attributed to a threat actor called CL-…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `45.32.113.172`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `139.180.134.221`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `202.182.102.5`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `45.76.210.43`
- **SHA256:** `00e09754526d0fe836ba27e3144ae161b0ecd3774abec5560504a16a67f0087c`
- **SHA256:** `f34bd1d485de437fe18360d1e850c3fd64415e49d691e610711d8d232071a0b1`
- **SHA256:** `dce5df29bddff5a4ddaea5c4fec14da91f7b69063a6e1c45ed61e5da4fc6c87b`
- **SHA256:** `cbfe8de6ffadbb1d396f61e63eb18e8b11c29527c1528641e3223d4c516cf7c3`
- **SHA256:** `4e1f8888d020decd09799ec946f1bf677cac6612b24582ddbf4d8ede425d8384`
- **SHA256:** `9b481b69cd91b09fa7bae7428f646dd89473a4c03393e43da81fe756cde1c472`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1003.001** — LSASS Memory
- **T1003** — OS Credential Dumping
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1574.014** — Hijack Execution Flow: AppDomainManager
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1505.003** — Server Software Component: Web Shell
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1573.001** — Encrypted Channel: Symmetric Cryptography
- **T1036.005** — Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### TinyRCT AppDomainManager injection via chrome_setup.exe loading MyAppDomainManager.dll

`UC_0_8` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_name="MyAppDomainManager.dll" OR Filesystem.file_name="chrome_setup.exe.config") by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.process_id Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName =~ "MyAppDomainManager.dll"
| where not(InitiatingProcessFolderPath has @"\Microsoft Visual Studio\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, DllName=FileName, DllPath=FolderPath, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### ASPX web shell execution: IIS w3wp.exe spawning shell/recon child processes

`UC_0_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.parent_process_name="w3wp.exe" AND (Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","whoami.exe","net.exe","net1.exe","nltest.exe","ipconfig.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","certutil.exe","sqlcmd.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.process_name Processes.process | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("w3wp.exe","aspnet_wp.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","whoami.exe","net.exe","net1.exe","nltest.exe","ipconfig.exe","systeminfo.exe","tasklist.exe","certutil.exe","sqlcmd.exe","bitsadmin.exe","curl.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### TinyRCT C2 and downloader beacon to CL-STA-1062 infrastructure IPs

`UC_0_10` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_ip IN ("45.32.113.172","139.180.134.221","202.182.102.5","45.76.210.43") by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.transport | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteIP in ("45.32.113.172","139.180.134.221","202.182.102.5","45.76.210.43")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Masquerading: VMware/XDR/PerfWatson binaries from non-standard paths

`UC_0_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("vmtools.exe","vmwared.exe","XDRAgent.exe","PerfWatson2.exe")) AND NOT (Processes.process_path="*\\VMware\\*" OR Processes.process_path="*Microsoft Visual Studio*") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FileName in~ ("vmtools.exe","vmwared.exe","XDRAgent.exe","PerfWatson2.exe")
| where not(FolderPath has @"\VMware\" and ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName has "VMware")
| where not(FileName =~ "PerfWatson2.exe" and FolderPath has @"\Microsoft Visual Studio\" and ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName has "Microsoft")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessVersionInfoCompanyName, ProcessVersionInfoProductName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### CL-STA-1062 / TinyRCT toolset known-bad SHA256 execution or file write

`UC_0_12` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process_hash IN ("00e09754526d0fe836ba27e3144ae161b0ecd3774abec5560504a16a67f0087c","f34bd1d485de437fe18360d1e850c3fd64415e49d691e610711d8d232071a0b1","dce5df29bddff5a4ddaea5c4fec14da91f7b69063a6e1c45ed61e5da4fc6c87b","cbfe8de6ffadbb1d396f61e63eb18e8b11c29527c1528641e3223d4c516cf7c3","4e1f8888d020decd09799ec946f1bf677cac6612b24582ddbf4d8ede425d8384","9b481b69cd91b09fa7bae7428f646dd89473a4c03393e43da81fe756cde1c472") by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process_path Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let badHashes = dynamic(["00e09754526d0fe836ba27e3144ae161b0ecd3774abec5560504a16a67f0087c","f34bd1d485de437fe18360d1e850c3fd64415e49d691e610711d8d232071a0b1","dce5df29bddff5a4ddaea5c4fec14da91f7b69063a6e1c45ed61e5da4fc6c87b","cbfe8de6ffadbb1d396f61e63eb18e8b11c29527c1528641e3223d4c516cf7c3","4e1f8888d020decd09799ec946f1bf677cac6612b24582ddbf4d8ede425d8384","9b481b69cd91b09fa7bae7428f646dd89473a4c03393e43da81fe756cde1c472"]);
union DeviceProcessEvents, DeviceFileEvents, DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where SHA256 in (badHashes)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, SHA256, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### LSASS process access / dump (credential theft)

`UC_LSASS` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process="*lsass*" OR Processes.process="*sekurlsa*"
        OR Processes.process="*MiniDump*" OR Processes.process="*comsvcs.dll*MiniDump*"
        OR Processes.process="*procdump*lsass*")
       OR (Processes.process_name="rundll32.exe" AND Processes.process="*comsvcs*MiniDump*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where ActionType == "OpenProcessApiCall"
| where FileName =~ "lsass.exe"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("MsSense.exe","MsMpEng.exe","csrss.exe",
                                          "svchost.exe","wininit.exe","services.exe",
                                          "lsm.exe","SearchProtocolHost.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, ActionType, FileName,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFolderPath, AccountName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Chinese-Speaking APT Deploys New TinyRCT Backdoor in Southeast Asia Campaign

`UC_0_7` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Chinese-Speaking APT Deploys New TinyRCT Backdoor in Southeast Asia Campaign ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count earliest(_time) AS firstTime latest(_time) AS lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where (Processes.process_name IN ("xdragent.exe","vmtools.exe","vmwared.exe","perfwatson2.exe","chrome_setup.exe","myappdomainmanager.dll"))
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name,
       Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_path
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
| append [
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_name IN ("xdragent.exe","vmtools.exe","vmwared.exe","perfwatson2.exe","chrome_setup.exe","myappdomainmanager.dll"))
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Chinese-Speaking APT Deploys New TinyRCT Backdoor in Southeast Asia Campaign
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (FileName in~ ("xdragent.exe", "vmtools.exe", "vmwared.exe", "perfwatson2.exe", "chrome_setup.exe", "myappdomainmanager.dll"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName,
          FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FileName in~ ("xdragent.exe", "vmtools.exe", "vmwared.exe", "perfwatson2.exe", "chrome_setup.exe", "myappdomainmanager.dll"))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `45.32.113.172`, `139.180.134.221`, `202.182.102.5`, `45.76.210.43`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `00e09754526d0fe836ba27e3144ae161b0ecd3774abec5560504a16a67f0087c`, `f34bd1d485de437fe18360d1e850c3fd64415e49d691e610711d8d232071a0b1`, `dce5df29bddff5a4ddaea5c4fec14da91f7b69063a6e1c45ed61e5da4fc6c87b`, `cbfe8de6ffadbb1d396f61e63eb18e8b11c29527c1528641e3223d4c516cf7c3`, `4e1f8888d020decd09799ec946f1bf677cac6612b24582ddbf4d8ede425d8384`, `9b481b69cd91b09fa7bae7428f646dd89473a4c03393e43da81fe756cde1c472`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 13 use case(s) fired, 19 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.