# [HIGH] npm now freezes high-impact accounts after risky account changes

**Source:** Aikido
**Published:** 2026-06-26
**Article:** https://www.aikido.dev/blog/npm-cooldown-account-changes-announcement

## Threat Profile

Blog News npm now freezes high-impact accounts after risky account changes npm now freezes high-impact accounts after risky account changes Written by Dania Durnas Published on: Jun 26, 2026 npm shipped a new protection this week for its most depended-on accounts. When npm detects a sensitive action on a high-impact account, like an email swap or the use of a 2FA recovery code, it puts that account into a 72-hour read-only state and sends an alert to the previous email address. The package insta…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **IPv4 (defanged):** `142.11.206.73`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `23.254.164.92`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `23.254.164.123`
- **Domain (defanged):** `sfrclak.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `hwsrv-1327785.hostwindsdns.com`
- **SHA256:** `221c45a790dec2a296af57969e1165a16f8f49733aeab64c0bbd768d9943badf`
- **SHA256:** `4a8860240e4231c3a74c81949be655a28e096a7d72f38fbe84e5b37636b98417`
- **SHA256:** `ae70dd4f6bc0d1c8c2848e4e6b51934626c4818dcb5af99d080ddbd7dc337185`
- **SHA1:** `2553649f2322049666871cea80a5d0d6adc700ca`
- **SHA1:** `d6f3f62fd3b9f5432f5782b62d8cfd5247d5ee71`
- **SHA1:** `07d889e2dadce6f3910dcbc253317d28ca61c766`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `142.11.206.73`, `23.254.164.92`, `23.254.164.123`, `sfrclak.com`, `hwsrv-1327785.hostwindsdns.com`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `221c45a790dec2a296af57969e1165a16f8f49733aeab64c0bbd768d9943badf`, `4a8860240e4231c3a74c81949be655a28e096a7d72f38fbe84e5b37636b98417`, `ae70dd4f6bc0d1c8c2848e4e6b51934626c4818dcb5af99d080ddbd7dc337185`, `2553649f2322049666871cea80a5d0d6adc700ca`, `d6f3f62fd3b9f5432f5782b62d8cfd5247d5ee71`, `07d889e2dadce6f3910dcbc253317d28ca61c766`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 3 use case(s) fired, 3 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.