# [HIGH] U.S. offers $10 million for hackers targeting WhatsApp, Signal users

**Source:** BleepingComputer
**Published:** 2026-06-29
**Article:** https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/us-offers-10-million-for-hackers-targeting-whatsapp-signal-users/

## Threat Profile

U.S. offers $10 million for hackers targeting WhatsApp, Signal users 
By Bill Toulas 
June 29, 2026
11:09 AM
0 




The U.S. Department of State is offering up to $10 million for information that helps identify or locate members of the UNC5792 and UNC4221 hacker groups, which are linked to Russia's intelligence and military services.




The bounty is part of the ‘Rewards for Justice’ (RFJ) program, which targets foreign state actors carrying out cyberattacks against U.S. critical infrastructure…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `add-signal-group.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `add-signal-groups.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `group-signal.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `groups-signal.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-device-off.online`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-group-add.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-group.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-group.tech`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-groups-add.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-groups.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-groups.tech`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-security.online`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-security.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signalgroup.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signals-group.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-confirm.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `confirm-signal.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `signal-protect.host`
- **Domain (defanged):** `teneta.join-group.online`
- **Domain (defanged):** `teneta.add-group.site`
- **Domain (defanged):** `group-teneta.online`
- **Domain (defanged):** `helperanalytics.ru`
- **Domain (defanged):** `teneta.group`
- **Domain (defanged):** `group.kropyva.site`
- **MD5:** `e078778b62796bab2d7ab2b04d6b01bf`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1566.002** — Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- **T1656** — Impersonation
- **T1598** — Phishing for Information
- **T1621** — Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- **T1111** — Multi-Factor Authentication Interception

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### UNC5792/UNC4221 Signal & WhatsApp typosquat lure-domain resolution

`UC_0_5` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where DNS.query IN ("add-signal-group.com","add-signal-groups.com","group-signal.com","groups-signal.site","signal-device-off.online","signal-group-add.com","signal-group.site","signal-group.tech","signal-groups-add.com","signal-groups.site","signal-groups.tech","signal-security.online","signal-security.site","signalgroup.site","signals-group.com","signal-confirm.site","confirm-signal.site","signal-protect.host","teneta.join-group.online","teneta.add-group.site") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer
| `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SignalLures = dynamic(["add-signal-group.com","add-signal-groups.com","group-signal.com","groups-signal.site","signal-device-off.online","signal-group-add.com","signal-group.site","signal-group.tech","signal-groups-add.com","signal-groups.site","signal-groups.tech","signal-security.online","signal-security.site","signalgroup.site","signals-group.com","signal-confirm.site","confirm-signal.site","signal-protect.host","teneta.join-group.online","teneta.add-group.site"]);
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where isnotempty(RemoteUrl)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (SignalLures)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Inbound mail delivering UNC5792 Signal recovery-key lure domains

`UC_0_6` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let SignalLures = dynamic(["add-signal-group.com","add-signal-groups.com","group-signal.com","groups-signal.site","signal-device-off.online","signal-group-add.com","signal-group.site","signal-group.tech","signal-groups-add.com","signal-groups.site","signal-groups.tech","signal-security.online","signal-security.site","signalgroup.site","signals-group.com","signal-confirm.site","confirm-signal.site","signal-protect.host","teneta.join-group.online","teneta.add-group.site"]);
let LureMail = EmailUrlInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(30d)
    | where UrlDomain has_any (SignalLures) or Url has_any (SignalLures)
    | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain;
EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
| join kind=inner LureMail on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, SenderFromAddress, SenderMailFromAddress, SenderDisplayName, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, Url, UrlDomain, DeliveryAction, DeliveryLocation
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Signal linked-device hijack URI (sgnl://linkdevice) & recovery-key lure pages

`UC_0_7` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*sgnl://linkdevice*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process Processes.process_name Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let CredLures = dynamic(["signal-security.online","signal-security.site","signal-device-off.online","signal-confirm.site","confirm-signal.site","signal-protect.host"]);
DeviceEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where (RemoteUrl has "sgnl://linkdevice" or ProcessCommandLine has "sgnl://linkdevice" or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "sgnl://linkdevice")
    or RemoteUrl has_any (CredLures)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ActionType, RemoteUrl, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `add-signal-group.com`, `add-signal-groups.com`, `group-signal.com`, `groups-signal.site`, `signal-device-off.online`, `signal-group-add.com`, `signal-group.site`, `signal-group.tech` _(+16 more)_

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `e078778b62796bab2d7ab2b04d6b01bf`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 8 use case(s) fired, 14 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.