# [HIGH] Fake Perplexity extension on Chrome Web Store tracked searches

**Source:** BleepingComputer
**Published:** 2026-06-30
**Article:** https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/fake-perplexity-extension-on-chrome-web-store-tracked-searches/

## Threat Profile

Fake Perplexity extension on Chrome Web Store tracked searches 
By Bill Toulas 
June 30, 2026
11:46 AM
0 
A malicious extension in the Chrome Web Store is masquerading as the Perplexity AI answer engine, intercepting search traffic and collecting browsing information.
Called "Search for perplexity ai," the extension routed search queries and real-time suggestions through its infrastructure before redirecting users to the legitimate search services.
Microsoft Threat Intelligence researchers said …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `perplexity-ai.online`
- **Domain (defanged):** `extension.tilda.ws`
- **Domain (defanged):** `oda.digital`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1176** — Browser Extensions
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1176.001** — Browser Extensions
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Malicious 'Perplexity AI' Chromium extension flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd written to browser profile

`UC_5_3` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where Filesystem.file_path="*flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd*" by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where FolderPath has "flkebkiofojicogddingbdmcmkpbplcd"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe","vivaldi.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, ActionType, FileName, FolderPath, InitiatingProcessFileName, SHA256
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Browser egress to fake-Perplexity interception infra (perplexity-ai.online / oda.digital / extension.tilda.ws)

`UC_5_4` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where (DNS.query="*perplexity-ai.online*" OR DNS.query="*oda.digital*" OR DNS.query="*extension.tilda.ws*") by DNS.src DNS.query DNS.answer | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has_any ("perplexity-ai.online","oda.digital","extension.tilda.ws")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe","vivaldi.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Suspicious browser extension installation

`UC_BROWSER_EXT` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Registry
    where (Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\*"
        OR Registry.registry_path="*\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\*")
    by Registry.dest, Registry.registry_path, Registry.registry_value_data, Registry.registry_value_name, Registry.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Registry)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceRegistryEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where RegistryKey has_any ("\Software\Google\Chrome\Extensions\","\Software\Microsoft\Edge\Extensions\","\Software\Mozilla\Firefox\Extensions\")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, RegistryKey, RegistryValueName, RegistryValueData,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessAccountName
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `perplexity-ai.online`, `extension.tilda.ws`, `oda.digital`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: IOCs present, 5 use case(s) fired, 6 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.