# [CRIT] Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints

**Source:** The Hacker News
**Published:** 2026-06-30
**Article:** https://thehackernews.com/2026/06/langflow-rce-exploited-to-deploy-monero.html

## Threat Profile

Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints 
 Ravie Lakshmanan  Jun 30, 2026 Vulnerability / Malware 
Threat actors are continuing to exploit a critical Langflow vulnerability as part of fresh attacks designed to deliver a Monero cryptocurrency miner.
The activity has been found to weaponize CVE-2026-33017 (CVSS score: 9.3), an unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in Langflow, indicating threat actors are scanning and targeting exposed artific…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2026-33017`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `83.142.209.214`
- **IPv4 (defanged):** `94.156.64.241`
- **SHA256:** `71af8bd9b8019b7e5f460ce4c5c14ff7716a2c2faaaf1f274ceaa54cb89723bc`
- **SHA256:** `33588aa446984d3340cab686d38f2aa85a70eb3f76c459da3eef0304592b99df`
- **SHA256:** `ddde47bf00324075c7eeb0b9d0ff0a5d1b95bfc619aca4b5def85263838212f2`
- **MD5:** `46096a72d84db5f1dafd944fcf6571c8`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1539** — Steal Web Session Cookie
- **T1555.003** — Credentials from Web Browsers
- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.004** — Command and Scripting Interpreter: Unix Shell
- **T1203** — Exploitation for Client Execution
- **T1562.001** — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify Tools
- **T1562.004** — Impair Defenses: Disable or Modify System Firewall
- **T1222.002** — Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
- **T1070.002** — Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
- **T1489** — Service Stop
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1053.003** — Scheduled Task/Job: Cron
- **T1574.006** — Hijack Execution Flow: Dynamic Linker Hijacking
- **T1552.004** — Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
- **T1021.004** — Remote Services: SSH
- **T1496** — Resource Hijacking
- **T1614** — System Location Discovery
- **T1016.001** — Internet Connection Discovery

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### Langflow CVE-2026-33017 RCE: web-app process spawns shell/curl/wget loader

`UC_4_10` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.parent_process_name IN ("python","python3","uvicorn","gunicorn","langflow") OR Processes.parent_process="*langflow*") (Processes.process_name IN ("sh","bash","dash","curl","wget")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_name Processes.parent_process Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where match(process, "(?i)(curl|wget|83\.142\.209\.214|94\.156\.64\.241|lambsys)") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("python","python3","uvicorn","gunicorn","langflow") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "langflow" | where FileName in~ ("sh","bash","dash","curl","wget") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("83.142.209.214","94.156.64.241","lambsys","curl","wget") or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has "langflow" | where AccountName !endswith "$" | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256 | order by Timestamp desc
```

### lambsys disables Linux security controls via sh -c cascade (chattr/setenforce/ufw/pkill)

`UC_4_11` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count values(Processes.process) as cmds dc(Processes.process) as distinct_cmds min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process_name IN ("chattr","setenforce","aa-disable","aa-teardown","ufw","iptables","sysctl","pkill","killall")) (Processes.process IN ("*setenforce 0*","*ufw disable*","*chattr -i*","*chattr +i*","*iptables -F*","*ld.so.preload*","*nmi_watchdog*","*AliYunDun*","*aliyun*","*kinsing*","*kdevtmpfsi*","*watchdogs*")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.parent_process_id | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | where distinct_cmds >= 3 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where FileName in~ ("chattr","setenforce","aa-disable","aa-teardown","ufw","iptables","sysctl","pkill","killall","service") | where ProcessCommandLine has_any ("setenforce 0","ufw disable","chattr -i","chattr +i","iptables -F","ld.so.preload","nmi_watchdog","AliYunDun","aliyun","kinsing","kdevtmpfsi","watchdogs","kthreaddi") | where AccountName !endswith "$" | summarize DistinctCmds=dcount(ProcessCommandLine), Cmds=make_set(ProcessCommandLine,50), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) by DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessId, InitiatingProcessFileName | where DistinctCmds >= 3 | order by DistinctCmds desc
```

### Outbound HTTP beacon and payload pull from lambsys C2 (83.142.209.214 / 94.156.64.241)

`UC_4_12` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_ip IN ("83.142.209.214","94.156.64.241") by All_Traffic.src_ip All_Traffic.dest_ip All_Traffic.dest_port All_Traffic.app All_Traffic.transport | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where RemoteIP in ("83.142.209.214","94.156.64.241") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteIP, RemotePort, RemoteUrl, Protocol | order by Timestamp desc
```

### lambsys persistence: writes to /etc/ld.so.preload, /etc/crontab and /var/spool/cron

`UC_4_13` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem where (Filesystem.file_path IN ("/etc/ld.so.preload","/etc/crontab","/var/spool/cron/*","/etc/cron.d/*")) by Filesystem.dest Filesystem.file_path Filesystem.file_name Filesystem.process_name Filesystem.action | `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)` | where NOT process_name IN ("dpkg","apt","apt-get","yum","dnf","rpm","crontab","cron") | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified","FileRenamed") | where FolderPath in~ ("/etc/ld.so.preload","/etc/crontab") or FolderPath startswith "/var/spool/cron" or FolderPath startswith "/etc/cron" | where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("dpkg","apt","apt-get","yum","dnf","rpm","cron","crontab") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine | order by Timestamp desc
```

### lambsys SSH-key worm: single host SSH fan-out to many internal destinations

`UC_4_14` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` dc(All_Traffic.dest_ip) as distinct_hosts count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic where All_Traffic.dest_port=22 by All_Traffic.src_ip | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)` | where distinct_hosts >= 10 | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents | where Timestamp > ago(7d) | where RemotePort == 22 | summarize DistinctHosts=dcount(RemoteIP), Hosts=make_set(RemoteIP,100), Procs=make_set(InitiatingProcessFileName,10), Parents=make_set(InitiatingProcessParentFileName,10), FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp) by DeviceName | where DistinctHosts >= 10 | order by DistinctHosts desc
```

### lambsys XMRig miner: ipinfo.io geo-check and known cryptominer hashes/cmdline

`UC_4_15` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where (Processes.process IN ("*--donate-level*","*stratum+tcp*","*ipinfo.io*","*xmrig*") OR Processes.process_hash IN ("ddde47bf00324075c7eeb0b9d0ff0a5d1b95bfc619aca4b5def85263838212f2","71af8bd9b8019b7e5f460ce4c5c14ff7716a2c2faaaf1f274ceaa54cb89723bc","33588aa446984d3340cab686d38f2aa85a70eb3f76c459da3eef0304592b99df","46096a72d84db5f1dafd944fcf6571c8")) by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.process_hash | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)` | `security_content_ctime(firstTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents | where Timestamp > ago(30d) | where SHA256 in ("ddde47bf00324075c7eeb0b9d0ff0a5d1b95bfc619aca4b5def85263838212f2","71af8bd9b8019b7e5f460ce4c5c14ff7716a2c2faaaf1f274ceaa54cb89723bc","33588aa446984d3340cab686d38f2aa85a70eb3f76c459da3eef0304592b99df") or MD5 == "46096a72d84db5f1dafd944fcf6571c8" or ProcessCommandLine has_any ("--donate-level","stratum+tcp","ipinfo.io","xmrig") | project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, FolderPath, ProcessCommandLine, SHA256, MD5 | order by Timestamp desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Infostealer — non-browser process accessing browser cookie/login DBs

`UC_BROWSER_STEALER` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where (Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Google\Chrome\User Data\*\Cookies*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\*\Login Data*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\logins.json*"
        OR Filesystem.file_path="*\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\*\cookies.sqlite*")
      AND NOT Filesystem.process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.process_name, Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.user
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where InitiatingProcessAccountName !endswith "$"
| where FolderPath has_any (@"\Google\Chrome\User Data\", @"\Microsoft\Edge\User Data\", @"\Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\")
| where FileName in~ ("Login Data","Cookies","logins.json","cookies.sqlite")
| where InitiatingProcessFileName !in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe","brave.exe","opera.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FolderPath, FileName, ActionType
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Article-specific behavioural hunt — Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints

`UC_4_9` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Article-specific bespoke detection — Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints ```
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Filesystem
    where Filesystem.action IN ("created","modified")
      AND (Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/crontab*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/etc/ld.so.preload*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/tmp/*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/spool/cron*" OR Filesystem.file_path="*/var/tmp/.*")
    by Filesystem.dest, Filesystem.user, Filesystem.process_name,
       Filesystem.file_path, Filesystem.file_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Filesystem)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Article-specific bespoke detection — Langflow RCE Exploited to Deploy Monero Miner on Exposed AI App Endpoints
// Hunts the actual binaries / paths / commandline fragments named
// in the article instead of a generic technique-class template.

// File-creation events for the named binaries / paths
DeviceFileEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("FileCreated","FileModified")
| where (FolderPath has_any ("/etc/crontab", "/etc/ld.so.preload", "/var/tmp/", "/var/spool/cron", "/var/tmp/."))
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FolderPath,
          FileName, ActionType, InitiatingProcessFileName,
          InitiatingProcessCommandLine
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `83.142.209.214`, `94.156.64.241`

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2026-33017`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `71af8bd9b8019b7e5f460ce4c5c14ff7716a2c2faaaf1f274ceaa54cb89723bc`, `33588aa446984d3340cab686d38f2aa85a70eb3f76c459da3eef0304592b99df`, `ddde47bf00324075c7eeb0b9d0ff0a5d1b95bfc619aca4b5def85263838212f2`, `46096a72d84db5f1dafd944fcf6571c8`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 16 use case(s) fired, 31 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.