# [CRIT] ARToken: Inside an EvilTokens affiliate panel targeting Microsoft 365

**Source:** Cisco Talos
**Published:** 2026-07-01
**Article:** https://blog.talosintelligence.com/artoken-inside-an-eviltokens-affiliate-panel-targeting-microsoft-365/

## Threat Profile

ARToken: Inside an EvilTokens affiliate panel targeting Microsoft 365 
By 
Michael Kelley 
Wednesday, July 1, 2026 06:00
Threat Advisory
Cisco Talos identified a fully-featured phishing-as-a-service (PhaaS) operator panel, branded "ARToken," that shares infrastructure, API contracts, and operational patterns with the EvilTokens platform documented by Sekoia and Microsoft in early 2026.
The ARToken panel exposes 80+ API endpoints for device code phishing, Primary Refresh Token (PRT) persistence, …

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **Domain (defanged):** `pamconj.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `dashboard-bl.pamconj.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `spx.pamconj.com`
- **Domain (defanged):** `clear90489058903-document.workers.dev`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1071.001** — Web Protocols
- **T1071.004** — DNS
- **T1071** — Application Layer Protocol
- **T1566.002** — Spearphishing Link
- **T1204.001** — User Execution: Malicious Link
- **T1059.001** — PowerShell
- **T1566.001** — Spearphishing Attachment
- **T1204.002** — User Execution: Malicious File
- **T1059.005** — Visual Basic
- **T1218** — System Binary Proxy Execution
- **T1021.002** — SMB/Windows Admin Shares
- **T1569.002** — Service Execution
- **T1528** — Steal Application Access Token
- **T1098.001** — Account Manipulation: Additional Cloud Credentials
- **T1204.004** — User Execution: Malicious Copy and Paste
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1219** — Remote Access Software
- **T1566.002** — Phishing: Spearphishing Link
- **T1656** — Impersonation
- **T1621** — Multi-Factor Authentication Request Generation
- **T1102.002** — Web Service: Bidirectional Communication
- **T1071.001** — Application Layer Protocol: Web Protocols
- **T1098.005** — Account Manipulation: Device Registration
- **T1606.002** — Forge Web Credentials: SAML/PRT Tokens
- **T1564.008** — Hide Artifacts: Email Hiding Rules
- **T1114.003** — Email Collection: Email Forwarding Rule
- **T1213.002** — Data from Information Repositories: SharePoint
- **T1114.002** — Email Collection: Remote Email Collection

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### ARToken vendor-impersonation phish: look-alike SharePoint tenant + workers.dev lure with SPF/DKIM/DMARC fail

`UC_3_10` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Email.All_Email where All_Email.direction="inbound" (All_Email.url="*mononapfpcom.sharepoint.com*" OR All_Email.url="*clear90489058903-document.workers.dev*" OR All_Email.url="*-docviewer.workers.dev*" OR All_Email.url="*-onedrive.workers.dev*" OR All_Email.url="*-adobe2.workers.dev*") by All_Email.src_user All_Email.recipient All_Email.subject All_Email.url | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 30d;
EmailEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
| where AuthenticationDetails has "compauth=none" or (AuthenticationDetails has "spf=fail" and AuthenticationDetails has "dkim=fail")
| join kind=inner (
    EmailUrlInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where UrlDomain in~ ("mononapfpcom.sharepoint.com","clear90489058903-document.workers.dev")
        or UrlDomain matches regex @"(?i)^[0-9a-f-]{8,}-(docviewer|onedrive|adobe2)\.workers\.dev$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
  ) on NetworkMessageId
| project Timestamp, SenderFromAddress, SenderMailFromAddress, RecipientEmailAddress, Subject, Url, UrlDomain, DeliveryAction, AuthenticationDetails
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### EvilTokens device-code MFA bypass: successful device-code auth then token replay from a different IP

`UC_3_11` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let Window = 2h;
let DeviceCode = AADSignInEventsBeta
    | where Timestamp > ago(14d)
    | where ErrorCode == 0
    | extend Details = tostring(AuthenticationProcessingDetails)
    | where Details has "Device Code"
    | project AuthTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, AuthIP = IPAddress;
AADSignInEventsBeta
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ErrorCode == 0 and IsInteractive == false
| join kind=inner DeviceCode on AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (AuthTime .. AuthTime + Window)
| where IPAddress != AuthIP
| summarize DistinctTokenIPs = dcount(IPAddress), TokenApps = make_set(Application, 10), FirstTokenUse = min(Timestamp) by AccountUpn, AuthTime, AuthIP
| order by AuthTime desc
```

### ARToken C2/panel and Cloudflare Workers lure beaconing (pamconj.com + {uuid}-*.workers.dev)

`UC_3_12` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Network_Resolution.DNS where (DNS.query="*.pamconj.com" OR DNS.query="pamconj.com" OR DNS.query="clear90489058903-document.workers.dev" OR DNS.query="*-docviewer.workers.dev" OR DNS.query="*-onedrive.workers.dev" OR DNS.query="*-adobe2.workers.dev") by DNS.src DNS.query | `drop_dm_object_name(DNS)` | sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 30d;
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where RemoteUrl endswith "pamconj.com"
    or RemoteUrl =~ "clear90489058903-document.workers.dev"
    or RemoteUrl matches regex @"(?i)^[0-9a-f-]{8,}-(docviewer|onedrive|adobe2)\.workers\.dev$"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### EvilTokens PRT persistence: Entra device registration / broker (WAM) sign-in after device-code auth

`UC_3_13` · phase: **install** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
AADSignInEventsBeta
| where Timestamp > ago(14d)
| where ApplicationId == "29d9ed98-a469-4536-ade2-f981bc1d605e"   // Microsoft Authentication Broker (WAM) — clientMode:"broker" PRT acquisition
| where ErrorCode == 0
| extend Details = tostring(AuthenticationProcessingDetails)
| where Details has "Device Code" or IsInteractive == false
| project Timestamp, AccountUpn, Application, IPAddress, Country, DeviceTrustType, AadDeviceId, IsInteractive
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### EvilTokens evidence suppression: malicious inbox rule (external forward / auto-delete / hide-to-RSS)

`UC_3_14` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where ActionType in ("New-InboxRule","Set-InboxRule","UpdateInboxRules")
| extend Raw = tostring(RawEventData)
| where Raw has_any ("ForwardTo","ForwardAsAttachmentTo","RedirectTo","DeleteMessage")
    or (Raw has "MoveToFolder" and Raw has_any ("Deleted Items","RSS","RSS Feeds","Conversation History","Archive"))
| project Timestamp, AccountDisplayName, AccountId, IPAddress, ActionType, Application, Raw
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### EvilTokens SharePoint/OneDrive bulk exfiltration from a single session

`UC_3_15` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where Application in ("Microsoft SharePoint Online","Microsoft OneDrive for Business")
| where ActionType in ("FileDownloaded","FileSyncDownloadedFull")
| summarize FileCount = dcount(ObjectName), Files = make_set(ObjectName, 20), FirstSeen = min(Timestamp), LastSeen = max(Timestamp)
    by AccountDisplayName, AccountObjectId, IPAddress, bin(Timestamp, 1h)
| where FileCount > 50    // 50 = bulk-download threshold; tune to org P95 of hourly per-user downloads
| order by FileCount desc
```

### Beaconing — periodic outbound to small set of destinations

`UC_BEACONING` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count, values(All_Traffic.dest_port) AS ports
    from datamodel=Network_Traffic.All_Traffic
    where All_Traffic.action="allowed" AND All_Traffic.dest_category!="internal"
    by _time span=10s, All_Traffic.src, All_Traffic.dest
| `drop_dm_object_name(All_Traffic)`
| streamstats current=f last(_time) AS prev_time by src, dest
| eval delta = _time - prev_time
| stats avg(delta) AS avg_delta stdev(delta) AS sd_delta count by src, dest
| where count > 30 AND sd_delta < 5 AND avg_delta>=30 AND avg_delta<=600
| sort - count
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(1d)
| where RemoteIPType == "Public" and ActionType == "ConnectionSuccess"
| project DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort, Timestamp
| sort by DeviceName asc, RemoteIP asc, RemotePort asc, Timestamp asc
| extend prev_dev = prev(DeviceName, 1), prev_ip = prev(RemoteIP, 1),
         prev_port = prev(RemotePort, 1), prev_ts = prev(Timestamp, 1)
| where DeviceName == prev_dev and RemoteIP == prev_ip and RemotePort == prev_port
| extend delta_sec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, prev_ts)
| summarize conn_count = count(), avg_delta = avg(delta_sec), stdev_delta = stdev(delta_sec)
    by DeviceName, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| where conn_count > 30 and avg_delta between (30.0 .. 600.0) and stdev_delta < 5.0
| order by conn_count desc
```

### Phishing-link click correlated to endpoint execution

`UC_PHISH_LINK` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
``` Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s ```
| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS click_time
    from datamodel=Web
    where Web.action="allowed"
    by Web.src, Web.user, Web.dest, Web.url
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| rename user AS recipient, dest AS clicked_domain, url AS clicked_url
| join type=inner recipient
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
         from datamodel=Email.All_Email
         where All_Email.action="delivered" AND All_Email.url!="-"
         by All_Email.recipient, All_Email.src_user, All_Email.url, All_Email.subject
     | `drop_dm_object_name(All_Email)`
     | rex field=url "https?://(?<email_domain>[^/]+)"
     | rename recipient AS recipient]
| join type=inner src
    [| tstats `summariesonly` earliest(_time) AS exec_time
         values(Processes.process) AS exec_cmd, values(Processes.process_name) AS exec_proc
         from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
         where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                                   "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
           AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                                            "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe",
                                            "cscript.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe",
                                            "curl.exe","wget.exe")
         by Processes.dest, Processes.user
     | `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
     | rename dest AS src]
| eval delta_sec = exec_time - click_time
| where delta_sec >= 0 AND delta_sec <= 60
| table click_time, exec_time, delta_sec, recipient, src, src_user, subject,
        clicked_domain, clicked_url, exec_proc, exec_cmd
| sort - click_time
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
// Phishing-link click that drives endpoint execution within 60s.
// Far higher fidelity than "every clicked URL" — most legitimate clicks
// never spawn a non-browser child process, so the join eliminates the
// 99% of noise that makes a raw click query unactionable.
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let SuspectClicks = UrlClickEvents
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | where ActionType in ("ClickAllowed","ClickedThrough")
    | join kind=inner (
        EmailEvents
        | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
        | where DeliveryAction == "Delivered"
        | where EmailDirection == "Inbound"
        | project NetworkMessageId, Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain,
                  RecipientEmailAddress, EmailTimestamp = Timestamp
      ) on NetworkMessageId
    | join kind=leftouter (
        EmailUrlInfo | project NetworkMessageId, Url, UrlDomain
      ) on NetworkMessageId, Url
    | project ClickTime = Timestamp, AccountUpn, IPAddress, Url, UrlDomain,
              Subject, SenderFromAddress, SenderFromDomain, RecipientEmailAddress,
              ActionType;
// Correlate to a non-browser child process spawned within 60 seconds on
// the recipient's device.
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("chrome.exe","msedge.exe","firefox.exe",
                                         "outlook.exe","brave.exe","arc.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","cmd.exe","mshta.exe",
                        "rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                        "bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe","curl.exe","wget.exe")
| join kind=inner SuspectClicks on $left.AccountName == $right.AccountUpn
| where Timestamp between (ClickTime .. ClickTime + 60s)
| project ClickTime, ProcessTime = Timestamp,
          DelaySec = datetime_diff('second', Timestamp, ClickTime),
          DeviceName, AccountName, RecipientEmailAddress, SenderFromAddress,
          Subject, Url, UrlDomain, ActionType,
          FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by ClickTime desc
```

### Email attachment opened from external sender

`UC_PHISH_ATTACH` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count
    from datamodel=Email.All_Email
    where All_Email.file_name!="-"
    by All_Email.src_user, All_Email.recipient, All_Email.file_name, All_Email.subject
| rename All_Email.recipient as user
| join type=inner user
    [| tstats `summariesonly` count
        from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
        where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
          AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
        by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
     | rename Processes.user as user]
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let LookbackDays = 7d;
let MalAttachments = EmailAttachmentInfo
    | where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
    | where AccountName !endswith "$"
    | project NetworkMessageId, RecipientEmailAddress,
              AttachmentFileName = FileName, AttachmentSHA256 = SHA256;
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(LookbackDays)
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("OUTLOOK.EXE","winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe",
                      "mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe")
| join kind=inner MalAttachments on $left.AccountUpn == $right.RecipientEmailAddress
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, AttachmentFileName, AttachmentSHA256
```

### Office app spawning script/LOLBin child process

`UC_OFFICE_CHILD` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| `security_content_ctime(firstTime)` | `security_content_ctime(lastTime)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("winword.exe","excel.exe","powerpnt.exe","outlook.exe","onenote.exe","mspub.exe","visio.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("cmd.exe","powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","mshta.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe","certutil.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### Remote service execution — PsExec / SMB lateral movement

`UC_LATERAL_PSEXEC` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
       OR (Processes.process_name="wmic.exe" AND Processes.process="*/node:*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("psexec.exe","psexesvc.exe","paexec.exe","smbexec.py")
   or (FileName =~ "wmic.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has "/node:")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessFileName
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### OAuth consent / suspicious app grant

`UC_OAUTH_ABUSE` · phase: **actions** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Authentication.Authentication
    where Authentication.action="success"
      AND Authentication.signature IN (
        "Consent to application",
        "Add app role assignment grant to user",
        "Add OAuth2PermissionGrant",
        "Add delegated permission grant")
    by Authentication.user, Authentication.app, Authentication.src, Authentication.signature
| `drop_dm_object_name(Authentication)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
CloudAppEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where ActionType in ("Consent to application.","Add OAuth2PermissionGrant.","Add delegated permission grant.")
| project Timestamp, AccountObjectId, AccountDisplayName, ActivityType,
          ActivityObjects, IPAddress, UserAgent
```

### Fake CAPTCHA / clipboard-injected PowerShell (ClickFix / FakeCaptcha)

`UC_FAKECAPTCHA` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*iex*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*hxxp*" OR Processes.process="*curl*" OR Processes.process="*wget*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("explorer.exe","RuntimeBroker.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe","mshta.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(iex|invoke-expression|frombase64|downloadstring|hxxp|curl |wget )"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### PowerShell encoded / obfuscated command

`UC_PS_OBFUSCATED` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
      AND (Processes.process="*-enc *" OR Processes.process="*EncodedCommand*"
        OR Processes.process="*FromBase64String*" OR Processes.process="*-nop*"
        OR Processes.process="*-w hidden*" OR Processes.process="*Invoke-Expression*"
        OR Processes.process="*IEX(*" OR Processes.process="*DownloadString*"
        OR Processes.process="*Net.WebClient*")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","pwsh.exe")
| where ProcessCommandLine matches regex @"(?i)(-enc|encodedcommand|frombase64string|-nop|-w\s+hidden|invoke-expression|iex\s*\(|downloadstring|net\.webclient)"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, ProcessCommandLine,
          InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessCommandLine
```

### RMM tool installed by non-IT user — remote-access utility for hands-on-keyboard

`UC_RMM_TOOLS` · phase: **install** · confidence: **High**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.process_name IN ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe","kaseya*.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.process_name, Processes.process, Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where FileName in~ ("AnyDesk.exe","TeamViewer.exe","TeamViewer_Service.exe",
        "ScreenConnect.ClientService.exe","ConnectWiseControl.ClientService.exe",
        "atera_agent.exe","SplashtopStreamer.exe","RustDesk.exe","NinjaOne.exe")
   or FileName matches regex @"(?i)kaseya.*\.exe"
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Network connections to article IPs / domains** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#network-ioc)) — phase: **c2**, confidence: **High**
  - IP / domain IOC(s): `pamconj.com`, `dashboard-bl.pamconj.com`, `spx.pamconj.com`, `clear90489058903-document.workers.dev`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **CRIT** based on: IOCs present, 16 use case(s) fired, 28 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.