# [HIGH] StepSecurity Maintained Actions Are Now Free for Public Repos

**Source:** StepSecurity
**Published:** 2026-07-01
**Article:** https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/stepsecurity-maintained-actions-are-now-free-for-public-repos

## Threat Profile

Back to Blog Product StepSecurity Maintained Actions Are Now Free for Public Repos StepSecurity Maintained Actions are now free for public repos. Secure, drop-in replacements for risky third-party GitHub Actions, reviewed and actively maintained. Varun Sharma View LinkedIn June 29, 2026
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Today we are excited to announce that StepSecurity Maintained Actions are now free for public repos…

## Indicators of Compromise (high-fidelity only)

- **CVE:** `CVE-2025-30066`
- **SHA1:** `0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67`

## MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

- **T1190** — Exploit Public-Facing Application
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain
- **T1027** — Obfuscated Files or Information
- **T1105** — Ingress Tool Transfer
- **T1195.001** — Compromise Software Supply Chain: Software Dependencies and Development Tools
- **T1195.002** — Compromise Software Supply Chain: Compromise Software Supply Chain

## Kill chain phases observed

_(none detected from narrative keywords)_

## Recommended hunts

### GitHub Actions runner outbound to gist.githubusercontent.com (tj-actions/changed-files CVE-2025-30066)

`UC_2_3` · phase: **c2** · confidence: **Medium** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Web.Web where (Web.url="*gist.githubusercontent.com*" OR Web.url="*gist.github.com*") by Web.src Web.dest Web.url Web.http_user_agent Web.app
| `drop_dm_object_name(Web)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(30d)
| where RemoteUrl has "gist.githubusercontent.com" or RemoteUrl has "gist.github.com"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("node.exe","node","python.exe","python3","python","curl.exe","curl","wget","Runner.Worker.exe","Runner.Worker")
     or InitiatingProcessParentFileName in~ ("Runner.Worker.exe","Runner.Worker","node.exe","node")
     or InitiatingProcessFolderPath has_any ("actions-runner","_work","_actions")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessAccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessFolderPath, InitiatingProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, RemoteUrl, RemoteIP, RemotePort
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### tj-actions/changed-files malicious commit 0e58ed86 referenced on host (CVE-2025-30066)

`UC_2_4` · phase: **delivery** · confidence: **High** · AI-generated for this article

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes where Processes.process="*0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67*" by Processes.dest Processes.user Processes.process_name Processes.process Processes.parent_process_name
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
| convert ctime(firstTime) ctime(lastTime)
| sort - lastTime
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
let ioc = "0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67";
union
 (DeviceProcessEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(90d)
  | where ProcessCommandLine has ioc or InitiatingProcessCommandLine has ioc
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="ProcessEvent", Account=AccountName, Evidence=ProcessCommandLine, Context=InitiatingProcessCommandLine),
 (DeviceFileEvents
  | where Timestamp > ago(90d)
  | where FolderPath has ioc or FileName has ioc or FolderPath has "tj-actions/changed-files"
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, Source="FileEvent", Account=InitiatingProcessAccountName, Evidence=FolderPath, Context=InitiatingProcessCommandLine)
| order by Timestamp desc
```

### Trusted vendor binary / installer launching unusual children

`UC_SUPPLY_CHAIN` · phase: **exploit** · confidence: **Medium**

**Splunk SPL (CIM):**
```spl
| tstats `summariesonly` count min(_time) as firstTime max(_time) as lastTime
    from datamodel=Endpoint.Processes
    where Processes.parent_process_name IN ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
      AND Processes.process_name IN ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
    by Processes.dest, Processes.user, Processes.parent_process_name, Processes.process_name, Processes.process
| `drop_dm_object_name(Processes)`
```

**Defender KQL:**
```kql
DeviceProcessEvents
| where Timestamp > ago(7d)
| where AccountName !endswith "$"
| where InitiatingProcessFileName in~ ("setup.exe","installer.exe","update.exe")
| where FileName in~ ("powershell.exe","cmd.exe","rundll32.exe","regsvr32.exe","mshta.exe","wscript.exe","cscript.exe","wmic.exe","bitsadmin.exe")
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, AccountName, InitiatingProcessFileName, FileName, ProcessCommandLine
```

### IOC-driven hunts (use shared templates)

These are standard IOC-substitution hunts — the canonical SPL and KQL live once in [`_TEMPLATES.md`](../_TEMPLATES.md), so we don't repeat the same boilerplate on every CVE / hash / network-IOC briefing.

- **Asset exposure — vulnerability matches article CVE(s)** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#asset-exposure)) — phase: **recon**, confidence: **High**
  - CVE(s): `CVE-2025-30066`

- **File hash IOCs — endpoint file/process match** ([template](../_TEMPLATES.md#hash-ioc)) — phase: **install**, confidence: **High**
  - file hash IOC(s): `0e58ed8671d6b60d0890c21b07f8835ace038e67`


## Why this matters

Severity classified as **HIGH** based on: CVE present, IOCs present, 5 use case(s) fired, 6 technique(s) inferred. Read the full article for actor attribution, tooling details, and any defanged IOCs in the body that aren't visible in the RSS summary.